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Maximal Procurement Under a Budget

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4884832
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00453-020-00781-9openalex-extracted
Budget Feasible Mechanisms on Matroids
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-017-0133-4openalex-extracted
A note on interval delegation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(71)90018-4openalex-extracted
Sufficient conditions in optimal control theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.06.003openalex-extracted
Ironing without control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1017518006179openalex-extracted
Well-Posed and Ill-Posed Optimal Control Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261392openalex-extracted
Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/710560openalex-extracted
Commitment versus Flexibility with Costly Verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00471.xopenalex-extracted
Optimal Delegation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611977073.114openalex-extracted
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329586openalex-extracted
Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329622openalex-extracted
Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design for Non-Monotone Submodular Objectives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3417746openalex-extracted
Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157115openalex-extracted
Relational Incentive Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912246openalex-extracted
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912769openalex-extracted
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320openalex-extracted
Moral Hazard and Observability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11696openalex-extracted
Large Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9288openalex-extracted
The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te3588openalex-extracted
Performance‐maximizing large contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te4259openalex-extracted
Optimal contests with incomplete information and convex effort costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1203.4455openalex-extracted
Budget Feasible Mechanism Design: From Prior-Free to Bayesian
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1902.04635openalex-snapshot
Optimal Budget-Feasible Mechanisms for Additive Valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2107.09239openalex-snapshot
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions
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