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Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning: Advances in Differentiable Economics

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_5openalex-snapshot
Welfare-Preserving $$\varepsilon $$-BIC to BIC Transformation with Negligible Revenue Loss
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-007-0100-7openalex-snapshot
Core-selecting package auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-011-9177-2openalex-snapshot
Constrained automated mechanism design for infinite games of incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(87)90007-3openalex-snapshot
A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasi-linear context
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.007openalex-snapshot
Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.001openalex-snapshot
Mixed bundling auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.09.001openalex-snapshot
Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108937535.028openalex-snapshot
Machine Learning for Matching Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781107298019openalex-snapshot
Understanding Machine Learning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139051972openalex-snapshot
A Contribution to the Pure Theory of Taxation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-021-00365-4openalex-snapshot
Learning equilibria in symmetric auction games using artificial neural networks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa053openalex-snapshot
When Is Pure Bundling Optimal?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2012.88openalex-snapshot
Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2013.72openalex-snapshot
Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2014.11openalex-snapshot
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.abk2607openalex-snapshot
The AI Economist: Taxation policy design via two-level deep multiagent reinforcement learning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abe2629openalex-snapshot
Using large-scale experiments and machine learning to discover theories of human decision-making
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611973730.8openalex-snapshot
An n -to-1 Bidder Reduction for Multi-item Auctions and its Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611976465.81openalex-snapshot
An Efficient ∊ -BIC to BIC Transformation and Its Application to Black-Box Reduction in Revenue Maximization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/16m1065719openalex-snapshot
Making the Most of Your Samples
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/sicompopenalex-snapshot
SIAM Journal on Computing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1134707.1134741openalex-snapshot
Empirical mechanism design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2213977.2214021openalex-snapshot
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2229012openalex-snapshot
Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229042openalex-snapshot
Symmetries and optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2559049openalex-snapshot
Payment Rules through Discriminant-Based Classifiers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2591796.2591867openalex-snapshot
The sample complexity of revenue maximization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085120openalex-snapshot
Dominant-Strategy versus Bayesian Multi-item Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3033274.3085153openalex-snapshot
Empirical Mechanism Design for Optimizing Clearing Interval in Frequent Call Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3055399.3055427openalex-snapshot
Efficient empirical revenue maximization in single-parameter auction environments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3055399.3055465openalex-snapshot
Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3105448openalex-snapshot
Simple Mechanisms for a Subadditive Buyer and Applications to Revenue Monotonicity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3437963.3441771openalex-snapshot
Optimizing Multiple Performance Metrics with Deep GSP Auctions for E-commerce Advertising
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3470442openalex-snapshot
Optimal auctions through deep learning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3543507.3583523openalex-snapshot
Platform Behavior under Market Shocks: A Simulation Framework and Reinforcement-Learning Based Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/988772.988793openalex-snapshot
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.2.585openalex-snapshot
Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20141212openalex-snapshot
Properties of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180654openalex-snapshot
Predicting and Understanding Initial Play
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20221679openalex-snapshot
Combinatorial Auctions in Practice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/ijoc.2023.1281openalex-snapshot
Learning Equilibria in Asymmetric Auction Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1398openalex-snapshot
Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7708openalex-snapshot
Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v25i1.7876openalex-snapshot
A Kernel-Based Iterative Combinatorial Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v31i1.10592openalex-snapshot
The Positronic Economist: A Computational System for Analyzing Economic Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5600openalex-snapshot
Reinforcement Mechanism Design: With Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16659openalex-snapshot
Reinforcement Learning of Sequential Price Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v35i6.16711openalex-snapshot
A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v36i5.20457openalex-snapshot
Coordinating Followers to Reach Better Equilibria: End-to-End Gradient Descent for Stackelberg Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1664openalex-snapshot
Optimal Mechanism for Selling Two Goods
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912001openalex-snapshot
Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297050openalex-snapshot
Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2023/293openalex-snapshot
Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta12618openalex-snapshot
Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1198openalex-snapshot
On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2010.06398openalex-snapshot
ProportionNet: Balancing Fairness and Revenue for Auction Design with Deep Learning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2101.11946openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium Learning in Combinatorial Auctions: Computing Approximate Bayesian Nash Equilibria via Pseudogradient Dynamics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.52202/068431-2746openalex-snapshot
Learning to Mitigate AI Collusion on Economic Platforms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.52202/075280-2449openalex-snapshot
A Scalable Neural Network for DSIC Affine Maximizer Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5555/2946645.3007027openalex-snapshot
Learning algorithms for second-price auctions with reserve
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Combinatorial Auctions

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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On Deterministic Optimal Mechanisms in Two-Item Setting for Distributions with Nondecreasing Density
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Mechanismusdesign und Auktionen
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-8312-3_27openalex-snapshot
Large-Scale Contextual Market Equilibrium Computation Through Deep Learning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4833-8_9openalex-snapshot
Mechanism Design and Auctions
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Contest partitioning in binary contests
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Formal contracts mitigate social dilemmas in multi-agent reinforcement learning
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Competitive Bidding Strategy in an Auction with Random Cutoff - Randomness is Always Unpredictable?
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An Optimal Reverse Affine Maximizer Auction Mechanism for Task Allocation in Mobile Crowdsensing
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Analysis and Design of a Distributed kWTA With Application in Sealed-Bid Auctions With Bidding Price Privacy Protection
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Communication-Efficient and Cross-Chain Empowered Federated Learning for Artificial Intelligence of Things
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