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What Really Matters in Auction Design
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0063openalex-snapshot
Reserve Prices without Commitment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0openalex-snapshot
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
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Discriminatory versus uniform treasury auctions: Evidence from when-issued transactions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0014-2921(97)00123-2openalex-snapshot
Auctions with almost common values: The `Wallet Game' and its applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1008174031940openalex-snapshot
Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1008196131032openalex-snapshot
Auctions and Regulation: Reengineering of Regulatory Mechanisms**
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/13.4.841openalex-snapshot
Toeholds, Bid Jumps, and Expected Payoffs in Takeovers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/6.4.733openalex-snapshot
Auctions of Divisible Goods: On the Rationale for the Treasury Experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6419.00083openalex-snapshot
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00096openalex-snapshot
Information Acquisition in Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00020openalex-snapshot
The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1986.tb01801.xopenalex-snapshot
SEALED‐BID VERSUS OPEN AUCTIONS: THE EVIDENCE
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.xopenalex-snapshot
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.4.805openalex-snapshot
Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/inte.23.3.99openalex-snapshot
Misapplications Reviews: Getting the Model Right—The Case of Competitive Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913707openalex-snapshot
Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2109776openalex-snapshot
The Treasury's Experiment with Single-Price Auctions in the Mid-1970s: Winner's or Taxpayer's Curse?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2556090openalex-snapshot
Strategic Bidding in a Multiunit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity in England and Wales
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2556091openalex-snapshot
Competition, Contracts, and Entry in the Electricity Spot Market
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Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
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Single and multi-winner auctions with performance obligation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.iimb.2011.12.004openalex-snapshot
Effect of firm variables on patent price
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2013.01.002openalex-snapshot
The forecasting accuracy of models of post-award network deployment: An application of maximum score tests
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.07.011openalex-snapshot
Using first-price auctions to sell heterogeneous licenses
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.004openalex-snapshot
Who pays when auction rules are bent?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.04.005openalex-snapshot
Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions: Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.05.008openalex-snapshot
Incumbency and entry in license auctions: The Anglo–Dutch auction meets another simple alternative
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.07.003openalex-snapshot
Auctions to implement the efficient market structure
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2008.09.001openalex-snapshot
The chopstick auction: A study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.06.003openalex-snapshot
Fighting collusion in auctions: An experimental investigation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.04.011openalex-snapshot
Raising rivals’ cost in multi-unit auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.05.006openalex-snapshot
Frontiers in spectrum auction design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102642openalex-snapshot
Cartel stability in experimental first-price sealed-bid and English auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102734openalex-snapshot
The energy transition: An industrial economics perspective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2023.102972openalex-snapshot
When Can Auctions Maximize Post-Auction Welfare?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2013.06.012openalex-snapshot
Multiple-round timber auction design and simulation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.infoecopol.2016.12.003openalex-snapshot
Information acquisition versus information manipulation in multi-period procurement markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jairtraman.2014.07.009openalex-snapshot
An incentive pricing mechanism for efficient airport slot allocation in Europe
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbvi.2021.e00254openalex-snapshot
Shared problem solving and design thinking in entrepreneurship research
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.133481openalex-snapshot
The design of the intertemporal trading ratio of carbon quotas
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2024.142705openalex-snapshot
Price responsiveness of solar and wind capacity demands
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.08.007openalex-snapshot
Do private equity consortiums facilitate collusion in takeover bidding?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.12.006openalex-snapshot
The price of environmental, social and governance practice disclosure: An experiment with professional private equity investors
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.12.011openalex-snapshot
A commentary on Mirowski's Market Comes to Bits: Evolution, Computation and Markomata in Economic Science: A view from theory–design relationship in engineering
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.007openalex-snapshot
The design, testing and implementation of Virginia’s NOx allowance auction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2008.09.006openalex-snapshot
Impact of valuation ranking information on bidding in first-price auctions: A laboratory study
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2019.01.011openalex-snapshot
Auctions with limited liability through default or resale
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2026.107690openalex-snapshot
Market selection of strategic thinking types
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.05.001openalex-snapshot
Buybacks with costly participation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.04.002openalex-snapshot
Menu theorems for bilateral contracting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.001openalex-snapshot
The Shill Bidding Effect versus the Linkage Principle
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2011.10.005openalex-snapshot
Premium auctions and risk preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105036openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof multi-object mechanism design: Ex-post revenue maximization with non-quasilinear preferences
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.05.003openalex-snapshot
Postprivatization corporate governance: The role of ownership structure and investor protection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.005openalex-snapshot
Global trends in IPO methods: Book building versus auctions with endogenous entry
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.003openalex-snapshot
Do auctions induce a winner's curse? New evidence from the corporate takeover market☆
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103066openalex-snapshot
Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: The role of tie-breaking rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jretai.2011.06.001openalex-snapshot
Bid-Elicitation Interfaces and Bidding Behavior in Retail Interactive Pricing
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrurstud.2026.104431openalex-snapshot
From market access to effective land markets: Institutional design and development in counties
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2008.07.006openalex-snapshot
Auction procedures and competition in public services: The case of urban public transport in France and London
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2009.03.001openalex-snapshot
Natural gas distribution in Italy: When competition does not help the market
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2021.101274openalex-snapshot
The competitive performance of public-private partnership markets. The case of unsolicited proposals in Peru
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2022.101412openalex-snapshot
The impact of transmission auctions on Brazilian electric power companies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2025.101962openalex-snapshot
Auctioning electricity transmission margins for competitive access to Brazil's National Interconnected System
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2025.102021openalex-snapshot
Abnormally low bids in PPPs: Analysis of evidence and a proposed statistical test
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