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Feedback and Competition in Procurement e-Auctions

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4863255
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure
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Auctions with endogenous participation
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Auctions with endogenous participation and an uncertain number of bidders: experimental evidence
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Participation constraints in the vickrey auction
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Auctions with entry
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Implementing reverse e-auctions: A learning process
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Late and multiple bidding in second price Internet auctions: Theory and evidence concerning different rules for ending an auction
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Auction and the informed seller problem
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Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions
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Indicative bidding: An experimental analysis
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Multi-battle contests
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Equilibria in first price auctions with participation costs
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The high/low divide: Self-selection by values in auction choice
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Auction fever: Rising revenue in second-price auction formats
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Combinatorial auctions with endowment effect
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An experimental investigation of asymmetric contests
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Endogenous entry and self-selection in private value auctions: An experimental study
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Equilibria in second price auctions with participation costs
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Intuitive and noncompetitive equilibria in weakly efficient auctions with entry costs
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AHP-based approaches for supplier evaluation: Problems and perspectives
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Experiments on Auction Valuation and Endogenous Entry
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Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More than Two Contestants
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An Experimental Analysis of Rent Seeking Under Varying Competitive Conditions
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Turning Up the Heat: The Discouraging Effect of Competition in Contests
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Bidder Preferences among Auction Institutions
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An Exploration of the Adoption of E-Auctions in Supply Management
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Entry and Competition Effects in First-Price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Procurement Auctions
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Optimal Privatisation using Qualifying Auctions
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INTENSITY OF COMPETITION, ENTRY AND ENTRY DETERRENCE IN RENT SEEKING CONTESTS
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COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2007.tb00269.xopenalex-extracted
Auctions within E‐Sourcing Events
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1937-5956.2012.01356.xopenalex-extracted
Increasing Revenue by Decreasing Information in Procurement Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712438355openalex-extracted
Fight or Flight?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0895330027166openalex-extracted
What Really Matters in Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20160290openalex-extracted
A Theory of Indicative Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1050.0433openalex-extracted
Better, Faster, Cheaper: An Experimental Analysis of a Multiattribute Reverse Auction Mechanism with Restricted Information Feedback
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1110.0354openalex-extracted
A Laboratory Investigation of Rank Feedback in Procurement Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400830138.177openalex-extracted
5 Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3710800openalex-extracted
Why Are Open Ascending Auctions Popular? The Role of Information Aggregation and Behavioral Biases
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1059984openalex-extracted
Effort Levels in Contests with Two Asymmetric Players
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865openalex-extracted
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912116openalex-extracted
Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
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Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study
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A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2753/mis0742-1222280408openalex-extracted
Effect of Information Feedback on the Outcomes and Dynamics of Multisourcing Multiattribute Procurement Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2513openalex-extracted
Inefficient rushes in auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/qe1692openalex-snapshot
Why Are Open Ascending Auctions Popular? The Role of Information Aggregation and Behavioral Biases
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