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Preserving Bidder Privacy in Assignment Auctions: Design and Measurement
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/nav.3800020109openalex-snapshot
The Hungarian method for the assignment problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2531openalex-snapshot
Walrasian Equilibrium with Gross Substitutes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2580openalex-snapshot
The English Auction with Differentiated Commodities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/11507840_26openalex-snapshot
Efficient Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Multi-unit Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36378-5_7openalex-snapshot
Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36504-4_6openalex-snapshot
A Two-Server, Sealed-Bid Auction Protocol
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-46088-8_28openalex-snapshot
Non-interactive Private Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-9863-7_100015openalex-snapshot
Mathematical Theory of Communication
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4757-3023-4_2openalex-snapshot
Linear Assignment Problems and Extensions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03549-4_20openalex-snapshot
Secure Multiparty Computation Goes Live
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15775-2_16openalex-snapshot
Online Stochastic Packing Applied to Display Ad Allocation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-77489-8_5openalex-snapshot
The Linear Assignment Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0177-4openalex-snapshot
Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-006-0001-yopenalex-snapshot
How to obtain full privacy in auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-013-1344-1openalex-snapshot
Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00754-3openalex-snapshot
On a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cose.2014.06.004openalex-snapshot
A practical solution for sealed bid and multi-currency auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.04.007openalex-snapshot
Multi-item Vickrey–Dutch auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.006openalex-snapshot
Information revelation in auctions with common and private values
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.010openalex-snapshot
On ascending Vickrey auctions for heterogeneous objects
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.09.004openalex-snapshot
Ascending price Vickrey auctions for general valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2009.05.008openalex-snapshot
Characterization of the Walrasian equilibria of the assignment model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(97)00028-6openalex-snapshot
Monte Carlo methods for security pricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-3932(03)00029-1openalex-snapshot
Implications of rational inattention
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316471609openalex-snapshot
Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511492556.010openalex-snapshot
Dynamic auctions in procurement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109000002325openalex-snapshot
Learning with Information Capacity Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261158openalex-snapshot
Elicitation of Honest Preferences for the Assignment of Individuals to Positions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/survival/44.1.176openalex-snapshot
India's Emerging Nuclear Posture. Ashley Tellis. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 2001. 885 pp. $25
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/icassp.2011.5947691openalex-snapshot
Is multiparty computation any good in practice?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/wsc.1995.478726openalex-snapshot
Recent advances in simulation for security pricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2005.00343.xopenalex-snapshot
An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1330332.1330338openalex-snapshot
On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/779928.779965openalex-snapshot
Preference elicitation in proxied multiattribute auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177728069openalex-snapshot
On a Measure of the Information Provided by an Experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828043052330openalex-snapshot
An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0895330027166openalex-snapshot
What Really Matters in Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.4.1535openalex-snapshot
Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.360openalex-snapshot
Entropy and the Value of Information for Investors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.96.3.602openalex-snapshot
An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.14.3.183openalex-snapshot
Vickrey Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth-Century Philately to Twenty-First-Century E-Commerce
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/ijoc.1070.0221openalex-snapshot
A Market Design for Grid Computing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/ijoc.1100.0431openalex-snapshot
A Clock-and-Offer Auction Market for Grid Resources When Bidders Face Stochastic Computational Needs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.1050.0052openalex-snapshot
Toward Comprehensive Real-Time Bidder Support in Iterative Combinatorial Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.1070.0151openalex-snapshot
A Computational Analysis of Linear Price Iterative Combinatorial Auction Formats
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.1100.0316openalex-snapshot
Research Commentary —Designing Smart Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.1120.0426openalex-snapshot
Efficiency with Linear Prices? A Game-Theoretical and Computational Analysis of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.1120.0452openalex-snapshot
Ascending Combinatorial Auctions with Allocation Constraints: On Game Theoretical and Computational Properties of Generic Pricing Rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.2016.0681openalex-snapshot
Coalition-Based Pricing in Ascending Combinatorial Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v26i1.8120openalex-snapshot
Online Task Assignment in Crowdsourcing Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.287576openalex-snapshot
The Consequences of Information Revealed in Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5963.1019openalex-snapshot
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913320openalex-snapshot
Job Matching with Heterogeneous Firms and Workers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2312726openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.25300/misq/2013/37.1.03openalex-snapshot
Impact of Information Feedback in Continuous Combinatorial Auctions: An Experimental Study of Economic Performance1
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3182/20140824-6-za-1003.01061openalex-snapshot
Smart Management of Electric Vehicles Charging Operations: the Vehicle-to-Charging Station Assignment Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Combinatorial Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262033428.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Simultaneous Ascending Auctions
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4769961openalex-extracted
Guiding Decentralized Production via AI Feedback: Evidence on Product Design and User Experience
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10796-022-10292-3openalex-snapshot
The Role of Sentiment Tendency in Affecting Review Helpfulness for Durable Products: Nonlinearity and Complementarity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.aei.2023.102116openalex-snapshot
Auction mechanism-based order allocation for third-party vehicle logistics platforms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.011openalex-snapshot
Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2026.106216openalex-snapshot
Minimum price equilibrium in the assignment market: Structural properties and the Serial Vickrey mechanism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.003openalex-snapshot
The ascending auction with flexible reporting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1556/2065.182.2021.2.9openalex-snapshot
Árverések – elmélettől a gyakorlatig: a 2020-as közgazdasági Nobel-emlékdíjról • Auctions – from Theory to Applications: On the 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences
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