On the public citation graph

Extreme Equilibria in a General Negotiation Model

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1014574
0 signed · 23 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4openalex-extracted
Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4_11openalex-extracted
Wage Bargaining as a Strategic Game
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(72)90136-6openalex-extracted
Existence of equilibria in economies with infinitely many commodities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1openalex-extracted
Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(89)90081-1openalex-extracted
The nash program: Non-convex bargaining problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90077-wopenalex-extracted
A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.012openalex-extracted
Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(01)00061-1openalex-extracted
Negotiation games with unobservable mixed disagreement actions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(96)00795-1openalex-extracted
The policy bargaining model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511607950openalex-extracted
Bargaining Theory with Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s000305540300056xopenalex-extracted
The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195300796.001.0001openalex-extracted
Repeated Games and Reputations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00024openalex-extracted
Repeated Games with Differential Time Preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/135684openalex-extracted
Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1906951openalex-extracted
Two-Person Cooperative Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912531openalex-extracted
Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913509openalex-extracted
Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2171907openalex-extracted
Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2224098openalex-extracted
A Mathematical Theory of Saving
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555589openalex-extracted
Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938299openalex-extracted
Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951630openalex-extracted
A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w3108openalex-extracted
Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.