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Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
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Reduced-rank hazard regression for modelling non-proportional hazards
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Life expectancy of international cartels: An empirical analysis
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A simple model of imperfect competition, where 4 are few and 6 are many
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An empirical study of the European corporate leniency program
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Leniency programs and cartel prosecution
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The cyclical behavior of the Department of Justice’s antitrust enforcement activity
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Chapter 1 Issues in Antitrust Enforcement
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Chapter 3 The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path
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Toward a Theory of Competition Policy
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Horizontal restrictions
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Nonparametric Maximum Likelihood Estimation of a Mixing Distribution
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Analysis of Cartel Duration: Evidence from EC Prosecuted Cartels
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Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration
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Partial Residuals for The Proportional Hazards Regression Model
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Proportional Hazards Tests and Diagnostics Based on Weighted Residuals
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Cartel contract duration: empirical evidence from inter-war international cartels
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A new look at the statistical model identification
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OPTIMAL CORPORATE LENIENCY PROGRAMS*
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Sustaining Collusion in Growing Markets
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fines , leniency , and rewards in antitrust
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Regression Models and Life-Tables
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Corporate Leniency Programs when Firms have Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre‐emption
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Modeling the Birth and Death of Cartels with an Application to Evaluating Competition Policy
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Private Monitoring and Communication in Cartels: Explaining Recent Collusive Practices
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Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement
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Determinants of Cartel Duration: A Cross-Sectional Study of Modern Private International Cartels
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Price Fixing Overcharges: Revised 2nd Edition
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Cartel Ringleaders and the Corporate Leniency Program
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2109841openalex-extracted
Delays in Leniency Application: Is There Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1057420openalex-extracted
Entry Barriers, Concentration, and Profits
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Technology and Market Structure: Theory and History
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Seller Concentration, Barriers to Entry, and Rates of Return in Thirty Industries, 1950-1960
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On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars
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A Dynamic Analysis of Export Cartels: The Japanese Case
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Sunk Costs and Market Structure: Price Competition, Advertising and the Evolution of Concentration.
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The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects
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Applying Cox Regression to Competing Risks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2601009openalex-extracted
The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938349openalex-extracted
Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Spells
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3315078openalex-extracted
The statistical analysis of failure time data. By J.D. Kalbfleisch and R.L. Prentice. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York, 1980. xi + 321 pp. U.S. $31.50, C $40.35. ISBN 0‐471‐05519‐0
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5282/ubm/epub.14315openalex-extracted
Delays in Leniency Application: Is There Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2648.001.0001openalex-extracted
The Effects of Competition
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Goodness-of-Fit Analysis for the Cox Regression Model Based on a Class of Parameter Estimators
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What Determines Cartel Success?
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Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/684041openalex-snapshot
When Can We Expect a Corporate Leniency Program to Result in Fewer Cartels?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12014openalex-snapshot
Corporate Leniency Programs when Firms have Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre‐emption
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