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Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

https://doi.org/10.2307/1593766
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00038-7openalex-snapshot
Some implications of antitrust laws for cartel pricing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(02)00057-7openalex-snapshot
Leniency programs and cartel prosecution
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New Ideas on the Structure of the Nervous System in Man and Vertebrates. By S. Ramón y Cajal. (Pp. 202; illustrated; £26.95.) MIT Press: Cambridge, MA.1990.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1007714728676openalex-snapshot
On Antitrust Enforcement and the Deterrence of Collusive Behaviour
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260979openalex-snapshot
The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/262075openalex-snapshot
Do Meetings in Smoke‐Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/466782openalex-snapshot
An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies
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Why do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603x9103600301openalex-snapshot
The Justice Department'S Crusade against Price-Fixing: Initiative Or Reaction?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.322121openalex-snapshot
Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.87248openalex-snapshot
The Optimal Prudential Deterrence of Price Fixing Agreements
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911462openalex-snapshot
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2109581openalex-snapshot
Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting Caught
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555995openalex-snapshot
Bid Rigging and the Threat of Government Prosecution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2696363openalex-snapshot
Optimal Collusion with Private Information

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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Cartel Stability with Time-Dependent Detection Probabilities
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A Structural Break Cartel Screen for Dating and Detecting Collusion
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Cartel Penalties Under Endogenous Detection
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Cartel pricing dynamics with reference-dependent preferences
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The deterrence of collusion by a structural remedy
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Does auction design facilitate collusion?
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Cartel pricing dynamics and discount factor uncertainty
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The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels
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Examining models of collusion: The market for lysine
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Internal cartel stability with time-dependent detection probabilities
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Imperfect competition law enforcement
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Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection
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Does enforcement deter cartels? A tale of two tails
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Post-Cartel Tacit Collusion: Determinants, Consequences, and Prevention
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Combining cartel penalties and private damage actions: The impact on cartel prices
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The effectiveness of leniency programs when firms choose the degree of collusion
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Price staggering in cartels
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The Impact of Cartel Dissolution on Prices: Evidence from the Air Cargo Cartel
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Estimating Cartel Damages with Model Averaging Approaches
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Some implications of antitrust laws for cartel pricing
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Chapter 3 The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path
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Chapter 5 Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests
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Chapter 15 Antitrust
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COMPETITION POLICY AND CARTEL SIZE
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OPTIMAL CARTEL PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF AN ANTITRUST AUTHORITY*
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CARTELISING GROUPS IN DYNAMIC HYPERBOLIC OLIGOPOLY WITH ANTITRUST THRESHOLD
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Evidence Dependence of Fine Reductions in Corporate Leniency Programs
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Are Antitrust Fines Friendly to Competition? An Endogenous Coalition Formation Approach to Collusive Cartels
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Tracing the Base: A Topographic Test for Collusive Basing-Point Pricing
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Maximal Cartel Pricing and Leniency Programs
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Imperfect Enforcement of Predatory Pricing Law
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The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing
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The Effects of Leniency on Maximal Cartel Pricing
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Antitrust Enforcement Under Endogenous Fines and Price-Dependent Detection Probabilities
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Collusive Networks in Market-Sharing Agreements Under the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
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Competitive Prices as Profit-Maximizing Cartel Prices
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Short-Term Managerial Contracts Facilitate Cartels
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Trust, Salience and Deterrence: Evidence from an Antitrust Experiment
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Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration
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The Determination of Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases: The Myth of Underdeterrence
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Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration
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Covert Networks and Antitrust Policy
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Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence
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Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence
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Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence
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Evaluating Leniency with Missing Information on Undetected Cartels: Exploring Time-Varying Policy Impacts on Cartel Duration
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The Determination of Optimal Fines in Cartel Cases: The Myth of Underdeterrence
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The Impact of Cartelization on Pricing Dynamics
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The Impact of Cartelization on Pricing Dynamics - Evidence from the German Cement Industry
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Concrete Shoes for Competition - The Effect of the German Cement Cartel on Market Price
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Estimating Damages from Price-Fixing - The Value of Transaction Data
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Delays in Leniency Application: Is there Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door?
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Delays in Leniency Application: Is There Really a Race to the Enforcer's Door?
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Selection Bias in Evaluating Policy: The Case of Anti-Trust
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The Fight against Cartels: A Transatlantic Perspective
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The Fight Against Cartels: A Transatlantic Perspective
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The Fight Against Cartels: A Transatlantic Perspective
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Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence from the European Union
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Antitrust Enforcement and Marginal Deterrence
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The Effects of Cartel Damage Compensations
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Legal Principles in Antitrust Enforcement
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The Role of Legal Principles in the Economic Analysis of Competition Policy
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The Dynamics of Mergers Among (Ex)Co-Conspirators in the Shadow of Cartel Enforcement
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The Dynamics of Mergers Among (Ex)Co-Conspirators in the Shadow of Cartel Enforcement
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Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge
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Penalizing Cartels: The Case for Basing Penalties on Price Overcharge
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Quantifying the Deterrent Effect of Anti-Cartel Enforcement
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The Effects of Leniency on Cartel Pricing
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What Can the Duration of Discovered Cartels Tell Us About the Duration of All Cartels?
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Policy Innovations, Political Preferences, and Cartel Prosecutions
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Endogenous Firms' Organization, Internal Audit and Leniency Programs
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Measuring the Effectiveness of Anti-Cartel Interventions: A Conceptual Framework
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The Dynamics of Leniency Application and Cartel Enforcement Spillovers
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Penalizing on the Basis of the Severity of the Offence: A Sophisticated Revenue-Based Cartel Penalty
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Cartel Stability by a Margin
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The Economics of Information Exchange between Competitors: Identifying the Optimal Policy Approach for Competition Authorities
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The Effectiveness of Leniency Programs when Firms choose the Degree of Collusion
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Collusion, Price Dispersion, and Fringe Competition
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Imperfect Competition Law Enforcement
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How Does Vertical Integration Affect the Incentive to Collude? A Study of Upstream Collusion in Vertically Related Markets
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Deteriorating Market Conditions and Cartel Formation under Manager Loss Aversion
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Collusion with Anticipated Damages Claims
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Analyzing Collusion Using Set-Identified Marginal Cost Functions *
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Ai Pricing Behavior Under Regulatory Variation
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Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Computational Framework
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Cartel Formation under Manager Loss Aversion
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Determination of Optimal Penalties for Antitrust Violations in a Dynamic Setting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.691562openalex-snapshot
Collusion Under Monitoring of Sales
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7010044openalex-snapshot
Cartel Behavior, Private Enforcement, and Overcharge Dynamics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.855966openalex-snapshot
The Pro-Collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.898007openalex-snapshot
How to Organize Crime
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.961264openalex-snapshot
Antitrust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.103548openalex-snapshot
Estimating the Value of Antitrust Investigations: A Case Study in Agriculture
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.22004/ag.econ.275718openalex-snapshot
Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1682.1135openalex-snapshot
The Pro-collusive Effect of Increasing the Repose Period for Price Fixing Agreements
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.22215/etd/2020-14363openalex-snapshot
Three Chapters Exploring Themes in Competition and Collusion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.22495/jgr_v6_i4_p6openalex-snapshot
A study of the regulative acts’ leniency clause effect on the behavior of the firms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3386/w12867openalex-snapshot
Antitrust
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3386/w30219openalex-snapshot
Screening Adaptive Cartels
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3386/w32347openalex-snapshot
A Field Experiment on Antitrust Compliance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3917/reco.646.1105openalex-snapshot
Competition and Coordination
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17155openalex-snapshot
Robust Screens for Noncompetitive Bidding in Procurement Auctions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.54648/woco2007038openalex-snapshot
Effective Cartel Enforcement in Europe
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.55444/2451.7321.2013.v51.n1.11876openalex-snapshot
¿Qué pasa cuando las multas por colusión no son suficientemente elevadas? Implicancias en la disuación del delito y la eficiencia productiva
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The fight against cartels: a transatlantic perspective
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The monetary impact of the interaction between public and private antitrust enforcement
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