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Dynamic Theory of Evolutionary Process of Constrained Contract Optimization and Adaptation to Evolving Shocks and Blockers, During the Agent’s Employment in the Firm

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2154081
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Agency problems as antecedents to unrelated mergers and diversification: Amihud and Lev reconsidered
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Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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The market for corporate control
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Organizational forms and investment decisions
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Management entrenchment
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Managerial discretion and optimal financing policies
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Managerial discretion and managerial compensation
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Managerial compensation and the threat of takeover
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Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
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INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR RISK AVERSION AND INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION
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Capital Structure and the Market for Corporate Control: The Defensive Role of Debt Financing
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Debt, Agency Costs, and Industry Equilibrium
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04026.xopenalex-extracted
Top-Management Compensation and Capital Structure
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Executive Careers and Compensation Surrounding Takeover Bids
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Dynamic Agency and the q Theory of Investment
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Information Asymmetry and Levels of Agency Relationships
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.169528openalex-extracted
CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An Empirical Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.173458openalex-extracted
Organizational Forms and Investment Decisions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.244158openalex-extracted
The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.94009openalex-extracted
Performance Pay and Top Management Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.94043openalex-extracted
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1884180openalex-extracted
Managerial Incentives and Capital Management
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912747openalex-extracted
Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
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The Efficiency Analysis of Choices Involving Risk
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A Theory of Wage Dynamics
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Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2329213openalex-extracted
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New Perspectives on Informational Asymmetry and Agency Relationships
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MANAGERIAL COMPENSATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: A GENERAL RESEARCH FRAMEWORK.
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The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization
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Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship
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Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w3000openalex-extracted
Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261677openalex-snapshot
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
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