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Payoff Equivalence of Efficient Mechanisms in Large Matching Markets
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
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On cores and indivisibility
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Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
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A general equivalence theorem for allocation of indivisible objects
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The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions
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A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets
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Stable Marriage and Its Relation to Other Combinatorial Problems
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Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets
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The Average Number of Stable Matchings
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Unbalanced random matching markets
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School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
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Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
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Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
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Expanding “Choice” in School Choice
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Random Serial Dictatorship: The One and Only
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On the Efficiency of Stable Matchings in Large Markets
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Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets
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College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
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Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result
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The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match
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Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
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Marriage, honesty, and stability
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Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
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