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Marriage, honesty, and stability
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1001/jama.275.13.1054openalex-snapshot
The National Residency Matching Program as a labor market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01934199openalex-snapshot
Stable marriage assignment for unequal sets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1981.11995301openalex-snapshot
Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261272openalex-snapshot
The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/sfcs.2001.959924openalex-snapshot
Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00335openalex-snapshot
The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1112/blms/23.4.402openalex-snapshot
THE STABLE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: STRUCTURE AND ALGORITHMS (Foundations of Computing)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/0402048openalex-snapshot
The Average Number of Stable Matchings
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/301250.301287openalex-snapshot
Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/571825.571856openalex-snapshot
A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.4.748openalex-snapshot
The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/inte.33.3.1.16013openalex-snapshot
High Tech for a Higher Authority: The Placement of Graduating Rabbis from Hebrew Union College—Jewish Institute of Religion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.9.1252.9784openalex-snapshot
Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.7.4.617openalex-snapshot
The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1402382openalex-snapshot
Urn Models and Their Application: An Approach to Modern Discrete Probability Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2554894openalex-snapshot
Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2583328openalex-snapshot
The Stable Marriage Problem: Structure and Algorithms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5555/644108.644144openalex-snapshot
An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
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Fair implementation of diversity in school choice
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Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: Evidence from the residency match
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The object allocation problem with random priorities
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Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly
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Entering classes in the college admissions model
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Large random matching markets with localized preference structures can exhibit large cores
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New techniques and tighter bounds for local computation algorithms
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Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
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Large roommate problem with non-transferable random utility
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Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*
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The International Refugee Match: A System that Respects Refugees’ Preferences and the Priorities of States
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Endogenous preferential treatment in centralized admissions
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The combinatorial assignment problem
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The college admissions problem with a continuum of students
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Unbalanced random matching markets
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3386/w29043openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3386/w31506openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2015008openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3934/jdg.2015009openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8354openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/te1357openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1207.4084openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1404.6103openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1407.2576openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1502.06318openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1509.04344openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1512.02698openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1701.00849openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1710.05262openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1806.04034openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1810.06229openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1910.04401openalex-snapshot
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2004.09075openalex-snapshot
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The size of the core in assignment markets
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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5555/2936924.2936947openalex-snapshot
Strategy-Proofness in the Stable Matching Problem with Couples
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5900/su_fass_wp.2012.20092openalex-snapshot
Fictitious students creation incentives in school choice problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.65109/nxrp1468openalex-snapshot
Coalitional Permutation Manipulations in the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226032900.003.0008openalex-snapshot
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Three Essays on Microeconomic Theory
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Characterizing and Leveraging Social Phenomena in Online Networks
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