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Can the Design of CEO Rewards Be Relied upon to Overcome the Agency Problem Created by the Separation of Ownership and Control?
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-006-9052-2openalex-extracted
The Nature of the Firm, Agency Theory and Shareholder Theory: A Critique from Philosophical Anthropology
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-012-9182-yopenalex-extracted
Corporate governance, compensation consultants, and CEO pay levels
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-xopenalex-extracted
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.12.003openalex-extracted
The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.01.003openalex-extracted
Are perks purely managerial excess?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.05.002openalex-extracted
Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder returns
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005722800141openalex-extracted
The Agent'ss Ethics in the Principal-Agent Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005880031427openalex-extracted
Reframing the Debate Between Agency and Stakeholder Theories of the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1089/glre.2016.201011openalex-extracted
LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., a Nevada corporation, Plaintiff, v. UKNOWN REGISTRANTS OF www.wn0000.com, www.wn1111.com, www.wn2222.com, www.wn3333.com, www.wn4444.com, www.wn5555.com, www.wn6666.com, www.wn7777.com, www.wn8888.com, www.wn9999.com, www.112211.com, www.4456888.com, www.4489888.com,…
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0335.1937.tb00002.xopenalex-extracted
The Nature of the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.1990.tb00207.xopenalex-extracted
CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466269openalex-extracted
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.146148openalex-extracted
CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, But How
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2041679openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: Where We are, and How We Got There
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1054700openalex-extracted
Corporate Finance: Principles and Practice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3475545openalex-extracted
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4172/2167-0358.1000203openalex-extracted
International Human Resource Management
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.12.003openalex-snapshot
Does backdating explain the stock price pattern around executive stock option grants?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511817410.026openalex-snapshot
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261677openalex-snapshot
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12127openalex-snapshot
Executive Remuneration and the Payout Decision
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