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A Re-Examination of the Equivalence of Strategies in Finite Extensive Form Games
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0050openalex-extracted
Efficient Computation of Behavior Strategies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0051openalex-extracted
Efficient Computation of Equilibria for Extensive Two-Person Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0536openalex-extracted
On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-0189-2_6openalex-extracted
Real Algebraic Tools in Stochastic Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01448847openalex-extracted
Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01454836openalex-extracted
�ber Kr�mmung und Windung geschlossener Raumkurven
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01766400openalex-extracted
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400166openalex-extracted
Ordinality in non cooperative games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(81)90018-1openalex-extracted
Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.011openalex-extracted
Backward induction in games without perfect recall
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1038/157172a0openalex-extracted
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9904-1952-09648-8openalex-extracted
Some notions and problems of game theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.14.4.575openalex-extracted
Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.16.4.694openalex-extracted
Stable Equilibria—A Reformulation. Part II. Discussion of the Definition, and Further Results
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881727-010openalex-extracted
9. A SIMPLIFIED TWO-PERSON POKER
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-012openalex-extracted
11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400882014-029openalex-extracted
28. Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912320openalex-extracted
On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951732openalex-extracted
The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781956298.00007openalex-extracted
Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781781956298.00008openalex-extracted
A Simple Three-Person Poker Game
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