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Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_5openalex-snapshot
A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 Are Few and 6 Are Many
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01737566openalex-snapshot
A simple model of imperfect competition, where 4 are few and 6 are many
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511528231.007openalex-snapshot
Non-cooperative games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1090/mbk/121/32openalex-snapshot
Theory of games and economic behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-012openalex-snapshot
11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9783111506951openalex-snapshot
Einführung in die Theorie der Spiele
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2003117openalex-snapshot
Einfuhrung in die Theorie der Spiele

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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4112007openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4112347openalex-extracted
On the Relevance of Irrelevant Strategies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4116821openalex-extracted
Information Design of Dynamic Mechanisms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4138071openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4153885openalex-extracted
Political Growth Collapses
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4156476openalex-extracted
Cooperation, Retaliation and Forgiveness in Revision Games with Deadline
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4160642openalex-extracted
Dynamic Pricing and Procurement with Buy-One-Get-One Promotions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4183855openalex-extracted
Externalities of Responsible Investments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4197318openalex-extracted
Countervailing Power in a Vertical Market Experiment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.429964openalex-extracted
Self-Enforcing International Agreements and Domestic Policy Credibility
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4342395openalex-extracted
The Cost of Curbing Externalities with Market Power: Alcohol Regulations and Tax Alternatives
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4396189openalex-extracted
Reorganizing Transformations on Game Forms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4569509openalex-extracted
Adaptive Parsimony as an Evolutionary Solution to the Equilibrium Selection Problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4594393openalex-extracted
Self-Coordinated Nash Equilibrium and its Application in New Classical Economics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4631405openalex-extracted
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with Self-Strategy-Independent Consistency: From a Characterization to a Differentiable Path-Following Method
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4634495openalex-extracted
Loss Sharing in Central Clearinghouses: Winners and Losers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4644454openalex-extracted
Taming Selten's Horse with Impulse Response ‡
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4653091openalex-extracted
A Re-Examination of the Equivalence of Strategies in Finite Extensive Form Games
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4656970openalex-extracted
Computing Perfect Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games
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