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Verifiable Private Disclosure in Auctions
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01770224openalex-extracted
Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-013-0374-xopenalex-extracted
Sending information to interactive receivers playing a generalized prisoners’ dilemma
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0177-4openalex-extracted
Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(87)90113-xopenalex-extracted
Auctions with a stochastic number of bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(90)90197-9openalex-extracted
Equilibrium bid functions for auctions with an uncertain number of bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.006openalex-extracted
Information disclosure to Cournot duopolists
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109615openalex-extracted
Voluntary information disclosure to Cournot oligopolists
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.08.003openalex-extracted
Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.03.008openalex-extracted
Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.11.007openalex-extracted
Auctions with uncertain numbers of bidders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001openalex-extracted
Information structures in optimal auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.12.002openalex-extracted
Full revelation of information in Sender–Receiver games of persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105020openalex-extracted
Information disclosure and full surplus extraction in mechanism design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105705openalex-extracted
Private disclosure with multiple agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/466995openalex-extracted
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00442.xopenalex-extracted
Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355302753399481openalex-extracted
Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20210504openalex-extracted
Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.22.2.115openalex-extracted
What the Seller Won't Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3907563openalex-extracted
Winner's Curse and Entry in Highway Procurement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1593709openalex-extracted
Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865openalex-extracted
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913603openalex-extracted
Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2171817openalex-extracted
Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2490910openalex-extracted
Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555625openalex-extracted
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555693openalex-extracted
Resolving Uncertainty about the Number of Bidders in Independent Private- Value Auctions: An Experimental Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003562openalex-extracted
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11070openalex-extracted
Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure
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