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Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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On Some Myths about Sequenced Common-Value Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.0116openalex-snapshot
Participation Costs and Efficient Auctions
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Strict Monotonicity in Comparative Statics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2415openalex-snapshot
Strategic Information Gathering before a Contract Is Offered
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2779openalex-snapshot
Price Competition for an Informed Buyer
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90100-vopenalex-snapshot
Entry and R & D in procurement contracting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.001openalex-snapshot
Information structures in optimal auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6451.00122openalex-snapshot
Auctions on the Internet: What’s Being Auctioned, and How?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00056openalex-snapshot
On the Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-unit Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00096openalex-snapshot
Information Acquisition in Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00262openalex-snapshot
The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1995.tb05186.xopenalex-snapshot
Initial Shareholdings and Overbidding in Takeover Contests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2526911openalex-snapshot
Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2527055openalex-snapshot
Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555786openalex-snapshot
Market Diffusion with Two-Sided Learning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951479openalex-snapshot
Monotone Comparative Statics

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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RANKING DISCLOSURE POLICIES IN ALL‐PAY AUCTIONS
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COMPETITION AND COST OVERRUNS IN PROCUREMENT*
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Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms
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Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms
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Discriminatory Information Disclosure
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Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing
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Optimal Information Disclosure in Classic Auctions
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Keyword Management Costs and “Broad Match” in Sponsored Search Advertising
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The Value of Consumer Data in Online Advertising
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Targeted Advertising and Media Market Competition
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Online Advertising and Privacy
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Information Release in Second-Price Auctions
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Disclosure or Not, When There're Three Bidders?
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Cheap Talk Advertising in Auctions: Horizontally vs Vertically Differentiated Products
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How Language Models Reshape Sponsored Search: Evidence from Google’s BERT Rollout
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Raising Bidders' Awareness in Second-Price Auctions *
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Verifiable Private Disclosure in Auctions
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Simultaneous Vs. Sequential Sales, Intensity of Competition and Uncertainty
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Competition and Cost Overruns in Procurement
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Persuasion by Cheap Talk
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The Making of a Good Impression: Information Hiding in Ad Exchanges1
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Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms
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Regional Auction Market for Agricultural Product in Indonesia
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Stochastic analysis of bidding in sequential auctions and related problems
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