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A Probabilistic Adaptation of the Boston Mechanism

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4808854
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2710openalex-extracted
A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0769-8openalex-extracted
The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0194-0openalex-extracted
New axioms for immediate acceptance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00329-7openalex-extracted
The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.007openalex-extracted
Strategy-proof and fair assignment is wasteful
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.05.001openalex-extracted
A solution to the random assignment problem on the full preference domain
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.05.003openalex-extracted
A characterization of the extended serial correspondence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.04.001openalex-extracted
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.04.005openalex-extracted
Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827openalex-extracted
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260757openalex-extracted
The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/689773openalex-extracted
Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/704573openalex-extracted
Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism versus Its Alternatives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00483.xopenalex-extracted
Random Matching Under Dichotomous Preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/0218003openalex-extracted
A Fast Parametric Maximum Flow Algorithm and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/1198513.1198520openalex-extracted
Rank-maximal matchings
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061openalex-extracted
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774669637openalex-extracted
The Boston Public School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.18.4.803openalex-extracted
Stable Matchings, Optimal Assignments, and Linear Programming
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-002openalex-extracted
1. A Certain Zero-sum Two-person Game Equivalent to the Optimal Assignment Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w16140openalex-extracted
Lotteries in Student Assignment: An Equivalence Result
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w29600openalex-extracted
From Immediate Acceptance to Deferred Acceptance: Effects on School Admissions and Achievement in England
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta13615openalex-extracted
Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1010openalex-extracted
Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1558openalex-extracted
A theory of school-choice lotteries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te5262openalex-extracted
A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4153/cjm-1956-045-5openalex-extracted
Maximal Flow Through a Network
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2005.06878openalex-extracted
Efficient and fair trading mechanisms for resource exchange in market design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2954.001.0001openalex-extracted
Fair Division and Collective Welfare
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