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The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0769-8
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2316openalex-snapshot
Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2469openalex-snapshot
A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2553openalex-snapshot
House Allocation with Existing Tenants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2710openalex-snapshot
A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_9openalex-snapshot
School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_17openalex-snapshot
From Boston to Shanghai to Deferred Acceptance: Theory and Experiments on a Family of School Choice Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0117-6openalex-snapshot
Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400177openalex-snapshot
Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0618-6openalex-snapshot
On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0774-yopenalex-snapshot
Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-006-0097-zopenalex-snapshot
Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-intern Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90074-1openalex-snapshot
Problems of fair division and the Egalitarian solution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(88)90130-5openalex-snapshot
A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-53187-2.00017-6openalex-snapshot
Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.009openalex-snapshot
Efficient priority rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.008openalex-snapshot
School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.010openalex-snapshot
House allocation with existing tenants: A characterization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.10.006openalex-snapshot
School choice: an experimental study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.001openalex-snapshot
On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.002openalex-snapshot
Constrained school choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.003openalex-snapshot
Why do popular mechanisms lack efficiency in random environments?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.002openalex-snapshot
Incentives in the probabilistic serial mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.02.007openalex-snapshot
Efficient assignment respecting priorities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.03.002openalex-snapshot
Local and global consistency properties for student placement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.02.002openalex-snapshot
Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.03.006openalex-snapshot
A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(00)00062-7openalex-snapshot
Coalition strategy-proofness and monotonicity in Shapley–Scarf housing markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0169-7218(10)00021-3openalex-snapshot
Fair Allocation Rules
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00038-5openalex-snapshot
Consistency in house allocation problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol052139015xopenalex-snapshot
Two-Sided Matching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260757openalex-snapshot
The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00076openalex-snapshot
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00166openalex-snapshot
Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00383openalex-snapshot
Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297openalex-snapshot
School Choice with Consent *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061openalex-snapshot
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774669637openalex-snapshot
The Boston Public School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774670167openalex-snapshot
The New York City High School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.4.1860openalex-snapshot
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.1.399openalex-snapshot
Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The “Boston Mechanism” Reconsidered
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.80openalex-snapshot
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.669openalex-snapshot
What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.4.1636openalex-snapshot
Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1954openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1070.0294openalex-snapshot
Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.8.3.319openalex-snapshot
The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1308730openalex-snapshot
Expanding 'Choice' in School Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1435263openalex-snapshot
Constrained School Choice: An Experimental Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2312726openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2554720openalex-snapshot
Axioms of Cooperative Decision Making.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2554894openalex-snapshot
Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w11965openalex-snapshot
Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w13225openalex-snapshot
Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w14618openalex-snapshot
Ex Ante Efficiency in School Choice Mechanisms: An Experimental Investigation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w14864openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the New York City High School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta7443openalex-snapshot
Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8354openalex-snapshot
Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1558openalex-snapshot
A theory of school-choice lotteries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2201openalex-snapshot
Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4067/s0718-52862012000200003openalex-snapshot
School choice and information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5900/su_fass_wp.2012.20043openalex-snapshot
Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/2954.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Fair Division and Collective Welfare

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2537594openalex-extracted
Minimal Consistent Enlargements of the Immediate Acceptance Rule and the Top Trading Cycles Rule in School Choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2653751openalex-extracted
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Centralized Course Allocation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3259836openalex-extracted
Joint Rank Efficiency for the Random Assignment Problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4020923openalex-extracted
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4051256openalex-extracted
School Choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4223258openalex-extracted
Strategic Priority-Based Course Allocation *
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4719264openalex-extracted
The Division Problem of Chances
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4755425openalex-extracted
The Division Problem of Chances
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Balancing stability and efficiency in team formation as a generalized roommate problem
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Behavioral Stable Marriage Problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-22820-8_5openalex-snapshot
Explaining Why Fair Roommate Matchings Do Not Exist
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-018-0621-2openalex-snapshot
Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0774-yopenalex-snapshot
Consistent strategy-proof assignment by hierarchical exchange
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0775-xopenalex-snapshot
The strategic sincerity of Approval voting
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1133-9openalex-snapshot
Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01223-6openalex-snapshot
Serial dictatorship mechanisms with reservation prices
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-023-01488-yopenalex-snapshot
When Does an Additional Stage Improve Welfare in Centralized Assignment?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-024-01632-2openalex-snapshot
Egalitarian random assignment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0954-3openalex-snapshot
Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0981-0openalex-snapshot
Characterizations of the Cumulative Offer Process
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-1010-zopenalex-snapshot
New axioms for deferred acceptance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-1024-6openalex-snapshot
Strategic schools under the Boston mechanism revisited
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01458-2openalex-snapshot
Constrained school choice: an experimental QRE analysis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-026-01655-9openalex-snapshot
A note on the strategic vulnerability of the Boston mechanism in random markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-016-0194-0openalex-snapshot
New axioms for immediate acceptance
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00246-7openalex-snapshot
Ex-post favoring ranks: a fairness notion for the random assignment problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-023-00329-7openalex-snapshot
The fractional Boston random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9594-zopenalex-snapshot
The Secure Boston Mechanism: theory and experiments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11263-022-01630-8openalex-snapshot
ISHIGAKI Retrieval System Using 3D Shape Matching and Combinatorial Optimization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-019-00172-6openalex-snapshot
Consistent Pareto Improvement over the Student Optimal Stable Mechanism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesedu.2022.11.001openalex-snapshot
School choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.022openalex-snapshot
Incompatibility between stability and consistency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111993openalex-snapshot
Characterizing a probabilistic version of the Boston mechanism under weak priorities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112501openalex-snapshot
School choice with rank-dependent priorities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.11.006openalex-snapshot
Size versus fairness in the assignment problem
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.004openalex-snapshot
Making just school assignments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.005openalex-snapshot
Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: An experimental investigation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.12.011openalex-snapshot
Cognitive ability and games of school choice
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Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility
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Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching
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School choice with preference rank classes
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Singles monotonicity and stability in one-to-one matching problems
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RAM: A collection of mechanisms for (indivisible) resource allocation in oTree
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Strategic priority-based course allocation
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Top trading cycles, consistency, and acyclic priorities for house allocation with existing tenants
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Partial strategyproofness: Relaxing strategyproofness for the random assignment problem
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Sequential school choice: Theory and evidence from the field and lab
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Local and global consistency properties for student placement
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When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?
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Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application
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Stepwise ordinal efficiency for the random assignment problem
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School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms
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Strategy-proofness and stability of the Boston mechanism: An almost impossibility result
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Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
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The modified Boston mechanism
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A new fairness notion in the assignment of indivisible resources
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A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem
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A matching theory perspective on legislative organization: assignment of committees
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An Overall Evaluation of the Chinese Admission System
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Comparative institutional analysis of participation in collaborative learning
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Design of Cognitive Radio Multi-User Multi-Channel Protocol Based on Matching Theory in Wireless Communications
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Optimizing Dynamic Task Assignment in Spatial Crowdsourcing: Bilateral Preference-Aware Approaches
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The Object Allocation Problem with Favoring Upper Ranks
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An axiomatic approach to characterizing and relaxing strategyproofness of one-sided matching mechanisms
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ISHIGAKI Retrieval through Combinatorial Optimization
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Simple Manipulations in School Choice Mechanisms
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Identifying the Harm of Manipulable School-Choice Mechanisms
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Stability Representations of Many-to-One Matching Problems: An Integer Optimization Approach
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A Dynamic Matching Mechanism for College Admissions: Theory and Experiment
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Asymptotic Welfare Performance of Boston Assignment Algorithms
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Stable Matching with Double Infinity of Workers and Firms
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Algorithms for Manipulating Sequential Allocation
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Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms
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A Probabilistic Adaptation of the Boston Mechanism
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Compromising Between Random Priority and Probabilistic Serial Mechanism
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First-Choice Maximality Meets Ex-ante and Ex-post Fairness
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School Choice: An analysis of the strategic behaviour of students and schools in the student high-school allocation problem
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Rank-Envy-Freeness in Roommate Matchings
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Measuring Inequality of Opportunity in Access to Quality Basic Education: A Case Study in Florida, US
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A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
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Planning support for school admission: towards equal opportunity for all : a case study in Florida
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The probabilistic rank random assignment rule and its axiomatic characterization
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Application of Various Mechanisms on Students School Choice Problem
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Random Assignment with Optional Participation
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House Allocation Problems and The Serial Dictatorship Rule
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Matching students to schools
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