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The Provision of Information and Incentives in School Assignment Mechanisms

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4810593
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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The impact of pay-for-percentile incentive on low-achieving students in rural China
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Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108227162.006openalex-extracted
What Really Matters in Designing School Choice Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol0521340446.002openalex-extracted
Game-theoretic analyses of trading processes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00220485.2013.825112openalex-extracted
The Consequences of Using one Assessment System to Pursue two Objectives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/02671522.2012.706631openalex-extracted
Using modern test theory to maintain standards in public qualifications in England
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/682718openalex-extracted
The Medium-Term Impacts of High-Achieving Charter Schools
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/699980openalex-extracted
The Demand for Effective Charter Schools
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/702625openalex-extracted
Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/704573openalex-extracted
Structural Estimation of a Model of School Choices: The Boston Mechanism versus Its Alternatives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/722227openalex-extracted
The Multidimensional Impact of Teachers on Students
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/uead010openalex-extracted
Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24openalex-extracted
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjac013openalex-extracted
Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qju011openalex-extracted
Injecting Charter School Best Practices into Traditional Public Schools: Evidence from Field Experiments *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdac025openalex-extracted
What is a Good School, and Can Parents Tell? Evidence on the Multidimensionality of School Output
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-112339openalex-extracted
Revealed Preference Analysis of School Choice Models
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.4.1373openalex-extracted
Information, School Choice, and Academic Achievement: Evidence from Two Experiments*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/rest.2010.12318openalex-extracted
Left Behind by Design: Proficiency Counts and Test-Based Accountability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061openalex-extracted
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.1.399openalex-extracted
Resolving Conflicting Preferences in School Choice: The “Boston Mechanism” Reconsidered
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.5.1805openalex-extracted
Pay for Percentile
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151425openalex-extracted
The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the New York City High School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20170129openalex-extracted
Heterogeneous Beliefs and School Choice Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20172040openalex-extracted
Do Parents Value School Effectiveness?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210949openalex-extracted
Why Do Households Leave School Value Added on the Table? The Roles of Information and Preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.4.1636openalex-extracted
Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1954openalex-extracted
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/app.20160634openalex-extracted
Free to Choose: Can School Choice Reduce Student Achievement?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/app.5.4.1openalex-extracted
Explaining Charter School Effectiveness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20190287openalex-extracted
Enhancing the Efficacy of Teacher Incentives through Framing: A Field Experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/inte.2014.0781openalex-extracted
Guiding School-Choice Reform through Novel Applications of Operations Research
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2012-0032openalex-extracted
When Does Inter-School Competition Matter? Evidence from the Chilean “Voucher” System
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2045678openalex-extracted
Explaining Charter School Effectiveness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3705097openalex-extracted
When Information is Not Enough: Evidence from a Centralized School Choice System
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4352040openalex-extracted
Social Interactions, Information, and Preferences for Schools: Experimental Evidence from Los Angeles
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.57.1.1118-9871r2openalex-extracted
Educator Incentives and Educational Triage in Rural Primary Schools
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w16710openalex-extracted
The Design of Performance Pay in Education
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w29690openalex-extracted
When Do Informational Interventions Work? Experimental Evidence from New York City High School Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w30274openalex-extracted
The Effects of Teacher Quality on Adult Criminal Justice Contact
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w32428openalex-extracted
Early Predictors of Racial Disparities in Criminal Justice Involvement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674984868openalex-extracted
Information, Incentives, and Education Policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w27887openalex-snapshot
When Information is Not Enough: Evidence from a Centralized School Choice System
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