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ESG and Executive Remuneration in Europe

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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s40804-023-00290-6openalex-extracted
The EU’s Proposed Reform of Directors’ Duties and the Missing Link to Soft Law
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-xopenalex-extracted
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.010openalex-extracted
Bank CEO incentives and the credit crisis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00083-6openalex-extracted
Pay for performance? Government regulation and the structure of compensation contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/lst.2023.35openalex-extracted
Executive compensation: investor preferences during say-on-pay votes and the role of proxy voting advisers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00213624.2005.11506874openalex-extracted
Pay without Performance: The Unfulfilled Promise of Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/gri012openalex-extracted
A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfs003openalex-extracted
Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the UK
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12481openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation Tied to ESG Performance: International Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.1990.tb00207.xopenalex-extracted
CEO INCENTIVES — IT'S NOT HOW MUCH YOU PAY, BUT HOW*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49openalex-extracted
Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1490openalex-extracted
Public Opinion and Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400841097openalex-extracted
Searching for a Corporate Savior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1561/108.00000010openalex-extracted
The Way We Pay Now: Understanding and Evaluating Performance-Based Executive Pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1561/108.00000030openalex-extracted
The Politics of Pay: The Unintended Consequences of Regulating Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1262867openalex-extracted
'Say on Pay': Cautionary Notes on the UK Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1418463openalex-extracted
Understanding Directors' Pay in Europe: A Comparative and Empirical Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1535355openalex-extracted
Paying for Long-Term Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.204528openalex-extracted
The End of History for Corporate Law
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2992287openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3544978openalex-extracted
The Illusory Promise of Stakeholder Governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3561164openalex-extracted
Should Corporations have a Purpose?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3589951openalex-extracted
For Whom is the Corporation Managed in 2020?: The Debate Over Corporate Purpose
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3711652openalex-extracted
The European Commission's Sustainable Corporate Governance Report: A Critique
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.375240openalex-extracted
Corporate Governance and Executive Remuneration: Rediscovering Managerial Positional Conflict
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3793732openalex-extracted
Stakeholder Syndrome: Does Stakeholderism Derail Effective Protections for Weaker Constituencies?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4034877openalex-extracted
The Economic (In) Significance of Executive Pay ESG Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4048003openalex-extracted
The Perils and Questionable Promise of ESG-Based Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4094283openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation Tied to ESG Performance: International Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4351613openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: Investor Preferences During Say-on-Pay Votes and the Role of Proxy Voting Advisors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w23596openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.67929/ecgi-law-165-2010openalex-extracted
Taming or Protecting the Modern Corporation? Shareholder-Stakeholder Debates in a Comparative Light
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