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Explaining the Compensation of Superstar CEOs: The Case of Elon Musk *

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4863514
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1956.tb03809.xopenalex-extracted
A New Interpretation of Information Rate
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2293openalex-extracted
Incentives, CEO Compensation, and Shareholder Wealth in a Dynamic Agency Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-014-9279-6openalex-extracted
Equilibrium Earnings Management and Managerial Compensation in a Multiperiod Agency Setting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90095-xopenalex-extracted
Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90048-oopenalex-extracted
Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-445850-5.50007-6openalex-extracted
THE STRONG CASE FOR THE GENERALIZED LOGARITHMIC UTILITY MODEL AS THE PREMIER MODEL OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.08.006openalex-extracted
The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2020.101300openalex-extracted
On the relation between managerial power and CEO pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261931openalex-extracted
Risk Aversion, Performance Pay, and the Principal-Agent Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jjfinec/nbac036openalex-extracted
Integrating Structural and Reduced-Form Methods in Empirical Finance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24openalex-extracted
Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv004openalex-extracted
Identifying and Testing Models of Managerial Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00075openalex-extracted
The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00080openalex-extracted
Managerial Compensation and the Cost of Moral Hazard
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12436openalex-extracted
Was Sarbanes–Oxley Costly? Evidence from Optimal Contracting on CEO Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00631.xopenalex-extracted
Compensation, Incentives, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2004.00673.xopenalex-extracted
Employee Stock Options, Corporate Taxes, and Debt Policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466269openalex-extracted
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555702openalex-extracted
Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49openalex-extracted
Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1593openalex-extracted
Superstar CEOs *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.421openalex-extracted
What Trade-off of Risk and Incentives?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1740openalex-extracted
Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1882openalex-extracted
The Risk Preferences of U.S. Executives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1561/1400000043openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2116555openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.320901openalex-extracted
Employee Stock Options, Corporate Taxes and Debt Policy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911363openalex-extracted
Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911724openalex-extracted
Repeated Moral Hazard
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913212openalex-extracted
The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297484openalex-extracted
On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297896openalex-extracted
Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2326626openalex-extracted
The Strong Case for the Generalized Logarithmic Utility Model as the Premier Model of Financial Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2938334openalex-extracted
Precautionary Saving in the Small and in the Large
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951619openalex-extracted
The First-Order Approach to Multi-Signal Principal-Agent Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320openalex-extracted
Moral Hazard and Observability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2008.83.3.789openalex-extracted
Optimal Team Size and Monitoring in Organizations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2004.16.1.149openalex-extracted
Lessons Lost in Linearity: A Critical Assessment of the General Usefulness of LEN Models in Compensation Research
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-9412141436openalex-extracted
Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2205.01175openalex-extracted
Integrating Structural and Reduced-Form Methods in Empirical Finance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261677openalex-snapshot
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.08559openalex-snapshot
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