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Reaching for the ‘Stars’ in CEO Compensation
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2009.12.001openalex-extracted
Executive pay and “independent” compensation consultants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.01.006openalex-extracted
Boardroom centrality and firm performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.05.001openalex-extracted
Performance-vesting provisions in executive compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2024.101708openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: The Trend Toward One Size Fits All
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.03.004openalex-extracted
Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical examination of alternative theories
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.007openalex-extracted
Does the use of peer groups contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.03.004openalex-extracted
Neighborhood matters: The impact of location on broad based stock option plans
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.12.006openalex-extracted
CEO pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.01.006openalex-extracted
Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.007openalex-extracted
Are all CEOs above average? An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.09.005openalex-extracted
CEO Compensation Contagion: Evidence from an Exogenous Shock
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.10.002openalex-extracted
Peer choice in CEO compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.01.001openalex-extracted
Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.06.002openalex-extracted
Relative peer quality and firm performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0378-8733(98)00009-4openalex-extracted
Centrality and power revisited: actor success in group decision making
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/0022250x.1972.9989806openalex-extracted
Factoring and weighting approaches to status scores and clique identification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/688176openalex-extracted
Text-Based Network Industries and Endogenous Product Differentiation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewp033openalex-extracted
Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn120openalex-extracted
Option Backdating and Board Interlocks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq053openalex-extracted
Product Market Synergies and Competition in Mergers and Acquisitions: A Text-Based Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhs115openalex-extracted
Is Disclosure an Effective Cleansing Mechanism? The Dynamics of Compensation Peer Benchmarking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhv038openalex-extracted
Board Structure and Monitoring: New Evidence from CEO Turnovers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhz104openalex-extracted
Shareholder Governance and CEO Compensation: The Peer Effects of Say on Pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12024openalex-extracted
Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advisors: Evidence from Say on Pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00801.xopenalex-extracted
Trends in Corporate Governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01687.xopenalex-extracted
Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01710.xopenalex-extracted
Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12122openalex-extracted
The Importance of Industry Links in Merger Waves
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1236498openalex-extracted
The Diffusion of Microfinance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034455openalex-extracted
Blockholders and Corporate Governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2008.123.1.49openalex-extracted
Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much? *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1080.0985openalex-extracted
Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1487openalex-extracted
Quantifying Managerial Ability: A New Measure and Validity Tests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2642924openalex-extracted
Through the Grapevine: Network Effects on the Design of Executive Compensation Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2755856openalex-extracted
Relative Pay for Non-Relative Performance: Keeping Up with the Joneses with Optimal Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2992287openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3030174openalex-extracted
Compensation Contagion: The Role of Peer Benchmarking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/256588openalex-extracted
POTENTIAL POWER AND POWER USE: AN INVESTIGATION OF STRUCTURE AND BEHAVIOR.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-50598openalex-extracted
Compensation Peer Groups and Their Relation with CEO Pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w23596openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.6082/m11n7z2topenalex-extracted
Assessing the Effects of Mandated Compensation Disclosures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1181022openalex-snapshot
Product Market Synergies and Competition in Mergers and Acquisitions: A Text-Based Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1349997openalex-snapshot
Compensation Peer Groups and Their Relation with CEO Pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2289566openalex-snapshot
Performance-Vesting Provisions in Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.361600openalex-snapshot
Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories
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