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Procurement with Manipulation

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4886492
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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An Introduction to Statistical Learning
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Reputation, competition, and entry in procurement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.10.008openalex-extracted
Publicity requirements in public procurement: Evidence from a regression discontinuity design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139175098openalex-extracted
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/342804openalex-extracted
Districting and Government Overspending
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/345578openalex-extracted
The Role of Wages and Auditing during a Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/466826openalex-extracted
Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvad017openalex-extracted
Discretion and Favoritism in Public Procurement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewaa004openalex-extracted
Bureaucratic Competence and Procurement Outcomes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewaa009openalex-extracted
Discretion and Supplier Selection in Public Procurement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewae009openalex-extracted
Sweeping the dirt under the rug: measuring spillovers of an anti-corruption measure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewr026openalex-extracted
Self-Enforcing Agreements and Relational Contracting: Evidence from California Highway Procurement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab029openalex-extracted
The Allocation of Authority in Organizations: A Field Experiment with Bureaucrats
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjr013openalex-extracted
Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjt004openalex-extracted
Using Notches to Uncover Optimization Frictions and Structural Elasticities: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rds024openalex-extracted
Credit within the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfs039openalex-extracted
Politically Connected Boards of Directors and The Allocation of Procurement Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2005.00146.xopenalex-extracted
PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MEASURE OF CORRUPTION, ILLUSTRATED WITH ITALIAN DATA
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015234openalex-extracted
Bunching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/154247603770383424openalex-extracted
Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1403openalex-extracted
Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_00183openalex-extracted
Traveling Agents: Political Change and Bureaucratic Turnover in India
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828041464498openalex-extracted
The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828042002606openalex-extracted
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282807780323578openalex-extracted
Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.4.1274openalex-extracted
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.4.1360openalex-extracted
Preferences and Incentives of Appointed and Elected Public Officials: Evidence from State Trial Court Judges
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.4.1288openalex-extracted
Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis of Adaptation Costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150487openalex-extracted
Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181169openalex-extracted
Two-Way Fixed Effects Estimators with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20181607openalex-extracted
A Few Bad Apples? Racial Bias in Policing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20191598openalex-extracted
Individuals and Organizations as Sources of State Effectiveness
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200738openalex-extracted
Public Procurement in Law and Practice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.4.1278openalex-extracted
Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130254openalex-extracted
Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20140188openalex-extracted
Corruption in Procurement and the Political Cycle in Tunneling: Evidence from Financial Transactions Data
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150426openalex-extracted
Tenure in Office and Public Procurement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/pol.20150511openalex-extracted
Manipulation of Procurement Contracts: Evidence from the Introduction of Discretionary Thresholds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2628openalex-extracted
The Effect of Discretion on Procurement Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1434/35247openalex-extracted
The awarding of public works in Italy: an analysis of the mechanisms for the selection of contractors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1920/re.ifs.2024.0601openalex-extracted
Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1825987openalex-extracted
The Awarding of Public Works in Italy: An Analysis of the Mechanisms for the Selection of Contractors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3753118openalex-extracted
Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w22207openalex-extracted
The Long-term Consequences of Teacher Discretion in Grading of High-stakes Tests
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.28-2977openalex-extracted
Procurement and public management: the fear of discretion and the quality of government performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.1.169openalex-snapshot
Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1434/35247:y:2011:i:2:p:235-272openalex-snapshot
The awarding of public works in Italy: an analysis of the mechanisms for the selection of contractors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1726340openalex-snapshot
Tenure in Office and Public Procurement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2602751openalex-snapshot
Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4081058openalex-snapshot
Sweeping the Dirt Under the Rug: Measuring Spillovers of an Anti-Corruption Measure
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