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Verifiability and Effective Persuasion
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1002openalex-extracted
Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.001openalex-extracted
Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.08.007openalex-extracted
A two-person game of information transmission
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00003-9openalex-extracted
Eliciting information from multiple experts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139060011.011openalex-extracted
Giving and Receiving Advice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/466995openalex-extracted
The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw039openalex-extracted
Public Protests and Policy Making*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00336openalex-extracted
Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12029openalex-extracted
Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2009.00559.xopenalex-extracted
Strategic Communication with Lying Costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2082796openalex-extracted
Information Aggregation, Rationality, and the Condorcet Jury Theorem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2490910openalex-extracted
Disclosure of Nonproprietary Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555625openalex-extracted
Relying on the Information of Interested Parties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2585673openalex-extracted
Consequences of the Condorcet Jury Theorem for Beneficial Information Aggregation by Rational Agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003562openalex-extracted
Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta11070openalex-extracted
Certifiable Pre-Play Communication: Full Disclosure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1790413openalex-snapshot
Strategic Information Revelation When Experts Compete to Influence
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