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CECL Adoption and the Contractual Usefulness of Accounting Earnings in Bank CEO Compensation

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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(93)90005-zopenalex-extracted
Accounting earnings and top executive compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(95)01219-2openalex-extracted
CEO compensation and bank risk Is compensation in banking structured to promote risk taking?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(94)00816-jopenalex-extracted
Executive pay and performance Evidence from the U.S. banking industry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-44-453594-8.00004-5openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2020.101748openalex-extracted
COVID-19 and stock market volatility: An industry level analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.03.002openalex-extracted
Do managers define non-GAAP earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.08.001openalex-extracted
CEO compensation and corporate risk: Evidence from a natural experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.08.006openalex-extracted
Audit committee financial expertise and earnings management: The role of status
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.05.001openalex-extracted
Performance-vesting provisions in executive compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2021.101428openalex-extracted
Cost Shielding in Executive Bonus Plans
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2025.101781openalex-extracted
Current Expected Credit Losses and consumer loans
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2008.09.003openalex-extracted
Executive compensation and competition in the banking and financial sectors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.09.004openalex-extracted
Managerial incentives and risk-taking☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.05.009openalex-extracted
Financial expertise of directors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.01.004openalex-extracted
Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.02.003openalex-extracted
The role of investment banker directors in M&A
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.01.010openalex-extracted
Compensation goals and firm performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.05.002openalex-extracted
Does improved information improve incentives?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.05.016openalex-extracted
Accounting for financial stability: Bank disclosure and loss recognition in the financial crisis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.01.004openalex-extracted
How much should we trust staggered difference-in-differences estimates?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00087-3openalex-extracted
Market valuations in the New Economy: an investigation of what has changed
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109012000646openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation and Business Policy Choices at U.S. Commercial Banks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2020.1770931openalex-extracted
The Real Effects of Financial Reporting on Pay and Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfab003openalex-extracted
How Are Bankers Paid?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhr044openalex-extracted
Tractability in Incentive Contracting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhw011openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation Incentives Contingent on Long-Term Accounting Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhw105openalex-extracted
The Effects of Short-Selling Threats on Incentive Contracts: Evidence from an Experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfu014openalex-extracted
Performance Terms in CEO Compensation Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12415openalex-extracted
Delays in Banks’ Loan Loss Provisioning and Economic Downturns: Evidence from the U.S. Housing Market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12463openalex-extracted
CECL: Timely Loan Loss Provisioning and Bank Regulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2005.00166.xopenalex-extracted
Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2012.00453.xopenalex-extracted
Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Contractual Usefulness of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01687.xopenalex-extracted
Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110217-022700openalex-extracted
Recent Research on Banks’ Financial Reporting and Financial Stability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466269openalex-extracted
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4187openalex-extracted
Board Committee Overlap and the Use of Earnings in CEO Compensation Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4223openalex-extracted
The Effect of the Paycheck Protection Program and Financial Reporting Standards on Bank Risk-Taking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.3025openalex-extracted
New Accounting Framework Faces Its First Test: CECL During the Pandemic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2992287openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4117869openalex-extracted
Current Expected Credit Losses (CECL) Standard and Banks' Information Production
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5124207openalex-extracted
Benefits and Challenges of the “CECL” Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2491081openalex-extracted
An Analysis of the use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2491205openalex-extracted
Sensitivity, Precision, and Linear Aggregation of Signals for Performance Evaluation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320openalex-extracted
Moral Hazard and Observability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/acch.2004.18.1.27openalex-extracted
Empirical Evidence on Recent Trends in Pro Forma Reporting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.1999.74.4.459openalex-extracted
The Explanatory Power of Earnings Levels vs. Earnings Changes in the Context of Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2003.78.4.957openalex-extracted
Price versus Non-Price Performance Measures in Optimal CEO Compensation Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/horizons-19-117openalex-extracted
The Development of Expected-Loss Methods of Accounting for Credit Losses: A Review with Analysis of Comment Letters
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2019-0003openalex-extracted
Why Do Large Positive Non-GAAP Earnings Adjustments Predict Abnormally High CEO Pay?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0226openalex-extracted
How Large Is the Pay Premium from Executive Incentive Compensation?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2022-0511openalex-extracted
How Does Loan Loss Accounting Influence Bank Lending? Evidence from the Current Expected Credit Loss (CECL) Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w23596openalex-extracted
Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5040/9781399423878.ch-02openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.7312/chew14856-006openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511763076.006openalex-snapshot
6. Pay without Performance: Overview of the Issues
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.434461openalex-snapshot
Empirical Evidence on Recent Trends in Pro Forma Reporting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112437.00018openalex-snapshot
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