On the public citation graph
What Does a Dynamic Oligopoly Maximize? The Continuous Time Markov Case
0 signed · 23 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-01059-5openalex-extracted
Discrete-Time Stochastic Control and Dynamic Potential Games: The Euler-Equation Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00933323openalex-extracted
Interactive economic dynamics and differential games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0873-zopenalex-extracted
Euler–Lagrange equations of stochastic differential games: application to a game of a productive asset
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10957-007-9262-5openalex-extracted
New Approach to Stochastic Optimal Control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11425-016-0264-6openalex-extracted
A survey of static and dynamic potential games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-014-0105-3openalex-extracted
Dynamic Potential Games: The Discrete-Time Stochastic Case
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-017-0218-6openalex-extracted
Potential Differential Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.automatica.2015.09.036openalex-extracted
Hamiltonian potential functions for differential games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2004.08.004openalex-extracted
Efficient Markov perfect Nash equilibria: theory and application to dynamic fishery games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0076-5392(08)x6169-7openalex-extracted
Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(03)00118-0openalex-extracted
Characterization of Markovian equilibria in a class of differential games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1889(97)00025-0openalex-extracted
Dynamic noncooperative game theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-0005(05)80055-4openalex-extracted
Chapter 23 Differential games — Economic applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1004693109541openalex-extracted
Identification of Efficient Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibria in a Class of Differential Games1
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1022674215872openalex-extracted
New Method to Characterize Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria in Differential Games
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/17442508.2019.1691208openalex-extracted
Stochastic differential games: the potential approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999x.1960.tb00275.xopenalex-extracted
WELFARE ECONOMICS AND EXISTENCE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2078030openalex-extracted
Keeping up with the Joneses: Consumption Externalities, Portfolio Choice, and Asset Prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w3279openalex-extracted
Asset Prices under Habit Formation and Catching up with the Joneses
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4975717openalex-snapshot
What Does a Dynamic Oligopoly Maximize? The Continuous Time Markov Case
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.