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Mechanism Design with Post-Allocation Inspection and Exclusion Penalties

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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0openalex-extracted
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2013.02.003openalex-extracted
Auctions with contingent payments — An overview
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261630openalex-extracted
Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00546.xopenalex-extracted
Mechanism Design with Interdependent Valuations: Efficiency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2764468.2764520openalex-extracted
Procurement Mechanisms for Differentiated Products
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3736252.3742549openalex-extracted
Approximately Optimal Online Mechanism for Multiunit Demand Buyers with Post-Allocation Inspection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.104.12.3779openalex-extracted
Optimal Allocation with Costly Verification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140494openalex-extracted
Optimal Allocation with Ex Post Verification and Limited Penalties
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1040.0214openalex-extracted
A Principal-Agent Model for Product Specification and Production
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1120.1539openalex-extracted
When Does It Pay to Delay Supplier Qualification? Theory and Experiments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2016.2572openalex-extracted
The Threat of Exclusion and Implicit Contracting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.0664openalex-extracted
Optimal Procurement Auctions Under Multistage Supplier Qualification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1080.0657openalex-extracted
RFQ Auctions with Supplier Qualification Screening
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2016.1558openalex-extracted
Auctions with Dynamic Costly Information Acquisition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2020.0651openalex-extracted
Optimal Auction Design with Deferred Inspection and Reward
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.0024openalex-extracted
Revenue Maximization Under Unknown Private Values with Nonobligatory Inspection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2349openalex-extracted
Procurement Mechanisms with Post-Auction Pre-Award Cost-Reduction Investigations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2359openalex-extracted
Mechanism Design Under Approximate Incentive Compatibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3569697openalex-extracted
The Scope of Sequential Screening with Ex-Post Participation Constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4823817openalex-extracted
Mechanism Design with Costly Inspection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5146874openalex-extracted
Inspect or Guess? Mechanism Design with Unobservable Inspection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297481openalex-extracted
Samurai Accountant: A Theory of Auditing and Plunder
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2297737openalex-extracted
Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555518openalex-extracted
Regulation, Asymmetric Information, and Auditing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2937855openalex-extracted
Optimal Auditing, Insurance, and Redistribution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te3101openalex-extracted
Costly verification in collective decisions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3700525openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design with Deferred Inspection and Reward
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