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Inspect or Guess? Mechanism Design with Unobservable Inspection

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0301-0openalex-snapshot
Auctions with costly information acquisition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.03.001openalex-snapshot
The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.09.001openalex-snapshot
Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.01.005openalex-snapshot
Whether or not to open Pandora's box
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/712735openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdv036openalex-snapshot
Search Deterrence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1109/focs.2011.90openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/1.9781611977912.18openalex-snapshot
Bandit Algorithms for Prophet Inequality and Pandora's Box
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1137/120878422openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Combinatorial Auctions: Expanding Single Buyer Mechanisms to Many Buyers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2940716.2940760openalex-snapshot
Descending Price Optimally Coordinates Search
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3328526.3329626openalex-snapshot
Pandora's Problem with Nonobligatory Inspection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3331033.3331039openalex-snapshot
Recent developments in prophet inequalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3391403.3399524openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Stochastic Matching Under Limited Time
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467547openalex-snapshot
Revenue Maximization Under Unknown Private Values With Non-Obligatory Inspection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467554openalex-snapshot
Fair Dynamic Rationing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3564246.3585229openalex-snapshot
Pandora Box Problem with Nonobligatory Inspection: Hardness and Approximation Scheme
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3580507.3597734openalex-snapshot
Tightness without Counterexamples: A New Approach and New Results for Prophet Inequalities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3670865.3673462openalex-snapshot
Improved Mechanisms and Prophet Inequalities for Graphical Dependencies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201098openalex-snapshot
Screening Inattentive Buyers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1910412openalex-snapshot
Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1404.1341openalex-snapshot
Multi-dimensional Virtual Values and Second-degree Price Discrimination
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2205.00588openalex-snapshot
Tightness without Counterexamples: A New Approach and New Results for Prophet Inequalities

What points at this work

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inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5139835openalex-extracted
Mechanism Design with Post-Allocation Inspection and Exclusion Penalties
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