On the public citation graph

Matching with Two Overlapping Types: A Mechanism Design Analysis of French College Admissions

0 signed · 44 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2469openalex-snapshot
A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2553openalex-snapshot
House Allocation with Existing Tenants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0704-4openalex-snapshot
An analysis of the German university admissions system
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0openalex-snapshot
On cores and indivisibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2021.101622openalex-snapshot
College admissions in three Chinese provinces: Boston mechanism vs. deferred acceptance mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.010openalex-snapshot
House allocation with existing tenants: A characterization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.07.001openalex-snapshot
The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2010.01.007openalex-snapshot
Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.004openalex-snapshot
School Choice with Controlled Choice Constraints: Hard Bounds Versus Soft Bounds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.12.006openalex-snapshot
Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105378openalex-snapshot
Gradual college admission
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.02.002openalex-snapshot
Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.04.016openalex-snapshot
Comparative advantage and preferences in college admissions in Turkey
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2021.1922661openalex-snapshot
Policy formation, termination and the multiple streams framework: the case of introducing and abolishing automated university admission in France
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260757openalex-snapshot
The Efficient Allocation of Individuals to Positions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/669915openalex-snapshot
Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the ROTC Branching Mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdad046openalex-snapshot
Fair Matching under Constraints: Theory and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061openalex-snapshot
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054825466openalex-snapshot
Matching with Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774669637openalex-snapshot
The Boston Public School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774670167openalex-snapshot
The New York City High School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.3.366openalex-snapshot
Stability and Strategy-Proofness for Matching with Constraints: A Problem in the Japanese Medical Match and Its Solution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.80openalex-snapshot
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130929openalex-snapshot
How to Control Controlled School Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.89.4.748openalex-snapshot
The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.4.1636openalex-snapshot
Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170364openalex-snapshot
College Admission with Multidimensional Privileges: The Brazilian Affirmative Action Case
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180386openalex-snapshot
Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.9.1252.9784openalex-snapshot
Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.1070.0294openalex-snapshot
Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2021.2184openalex-snapshot
School Choice in Chile
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v29i1.9320openalex-snapshot
Controlled School Choice with Soft Bounds and Overlapping Types
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.5297openalex-snapshot
Controlled School Choice with Soft Bounds and Overlapping Types
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4287509openalex-snapshot
Fairness Under Affirmative Action Policies with Overlapping Reserves
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4645537openalex-snapshot
Gradual Matching with Affirmative Action
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w16783openalex-snapshot
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3917/anso.202.0337openalex-snapshot
Les plateformes APB et Parcoursup au service de l’égalité des chances ?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10570openalex-snapshot
Matching With (Branch-of-Choice) Contracts at the United States Military Academy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2717openalex-snapshot
Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1701.00849openalex-snapshot
Effect of selfish choices in deferred acceptance with short lists
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2401.00307openalex-snapshot
Minimalist Market Design: A Framework for Economists with Policy Aspirations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2502.14690openalex-snapshot
Two-Sided Matching with Resource-Regional Caps
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5555/1070432.1070441openalex-snapshot
Marriage, honesty, and stability
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.