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Artificial Intelligence in the Boardroom

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5409542
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.08.008openalex-snapshot
Boards: Does one size fit all☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.03.004openalex-snapshot
The determinants of board structure☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.10.007openalex-snapshot
Board structure and price informativeness☆
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010openalex-snapshot
The costs of intense board monitoring
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.004openalex-snapshot
Are busy boards detrimental?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.04.013openalex-snapshot
Does the director labor market offer ex post settling-up for CEOs? The case of acquisitions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.004openalex-snapshot
Board composition and CEO power
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.04.010openalex-snapshot
Director skill sets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0929-1199(97)00009-6openalex-snapshot
Board effectiveness and board dissent: A model of the board's relationship to management and shareholders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0022109000002313openalex-snapshot
Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate Boards
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/262063openalex-snapshot
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/317671openalex-snapshot
Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/467037openalex-snapshot
Separation of Ownership and Control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdu043openalex-snapshot
Optimal Contracting and the Organization of Knowledge
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhaa006openalex-snapshot
Deadlock on the Board
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhac072openalex-snapshot
Why Do Boards Exist? Governance Design in the Absence of Corporate Law
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhl030openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Board Control and Size
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq018openalex-snapshot
CEO Replacement Under Private Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht075openalex-snapshot
Communication and Decision-Making in Corporate Boards
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhx068openalex-snapshot
Authority, Consensus, and Governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12351openalex-snapshot
Strategic Director Appointments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00891.xopenalex-snapshot
Information Control, Career Concerns, and Corporate Governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.xopenalex-snapshot
A Theory of Friendly Boards
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12287openalex-snapshot
The Labor Market for Directors and Externalities in Corporate Governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12692openalex-snapshot
Creditor Control Rights and Board Independence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12834openalex-snapshot
Words Speak Louder without Actions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555325openalex-snapshot
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2762openalex-snapshot
A Theory of Corporate Boards and Forced CEO Turnover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/stsc.2024.0190openalex-snapshot
Artificial Intelligence and Strategic Decision-Making: Evidence from Entrepreneurs and Investors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5455842openalex-snapshot
AI Agents for Economic Research
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-52210openalex-snapshot
Biased Boards
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