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CEO Replacement Under Private Information

https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq018
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-24002-9_15openalex-snapshot
Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(90)90066-sopenalex-snapshot
Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(85)90027-8openalex-snapshot
Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(85)90036-9openalex-snapshot
Golden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(93)90007-3openalex-snapshot
Additional evidence on the association between the investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(95)00416-5openalex-snapshot
CEO compensation: The role of individual performance evaluation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(88)90053-0openalex-snapshot
Outside directors and CEO turnover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(89)90099-8openalex-snapshot
Management entrenchment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405x(92)90029-wopenalex-snapshot
The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.01.006openalex-snapshot
Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.03.004openalex-snapshot
Why do some firms give stock options to all employees?: An empirical examination of alternative theories
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.11.007openalex-snapshot
Managerial incentives, capital reallocation, and the business cycle
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(98)00044-5openalex-snapshot
The effect of competition on CEO turnover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4101(99)00019-1openalex-snapshot
The use of equity grants to manage optimal equity incentive levels
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(00)00083-7openalex-snapshot
CEO turnover, firm performance and corporate governance: empirical evidence on Danish firms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(96)01032-6openalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00003-2openalex-snapshot
The decline of takeovers and disciplinary managerial turnover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(97)00016-0openalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0929-1199(00)00014-6openalex-snapshot
Golden parachutes and managerial incentives in corporate acquisitions: evidence from the 1980s and 1990s
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511559594.004openalex-snapshot
Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/209714openalex-snapshot
Compensation, Turnover, and Top Management Incentives: Historical Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/250012openalex-snapshot
Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/250051openalex-snapshot
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The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261657openalex-snapshot
Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261967openalex-snapshot
Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/341874openalex-snapshot
The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/367752openalex-snapshot
The Match between CEO and Firm*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/gri017openalex-snapshot
The Growth of Executive Pay
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/7.1.1openalex-snapshot
Optimal Design of Securities under Asymmetric Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfn011openalex-snapshot
Shareholder Rights, Boards, and CEO Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00180openalex-snapshot
Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00405openalex-snapshot
Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long‐Term Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00536openalex-snapshot
Entrenchment and Severance Pay in Optimal Governance Structures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00549.xopenalex-snapshot
Managerial Compensation and Capital Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1530-9134.2006.00110.xopenalex-snapshot
Synergies and Internal Agency Conflicts: The Double‐Edged Sword of Mergers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.xopenalex-snapshot
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04027.xopenalex-snapshot
Influence Costs and Capital Structure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00801.xopenalex-snapshot
Trends in Corporate Governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00814.xopenalex-snapshot
CEO Compensation, Change, and Corporate Strategy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.xopenalex-snapshot
A Theory of Friendly Boards
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/00335530152466269openalex-snapshot
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.529923openalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.656085openalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.671742openalex-snapshot
The Manager's Share
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.984376openalex-snapshot
Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2329018openalex-snapshot
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2491081openalex-snapshot
An Analysis of the use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2491102openalex-snapshot
Earnings Management in an Overlapping Generations Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555472openalex-snapshot
Antitakeover Measures, Golden Parachutes, and Target Firm Shareholder Welfare
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2555780openalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2556012openalex-snapshot
Costly Distortion of Information in Agency Problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320openalex-snapshot
Moral Hazard and Observability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w4145openalex-snapshot
Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w6213openalex-snapshot
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inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w6634openalex-snapshot
The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5465/amp.2006.19873407openalex-snapshot
Pay without Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.26-4566openalex-snapshot
The hero's farewell: what happens when CEOs retire

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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Pay (Be)fore Performance: The Signing Bonus as an Incentive Device
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Ex Ante Severance Agreements and Timely Disclosure of Bad News*
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CEO Turnover in a Competitive Assignment Framework
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Financing Experimentation
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The Incentive for Separation: Job Training and Put Options
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Information Externalities in Corporate Governance
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The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium
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Golden Parachutes, Takeover Probability, and Risk-Taking
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Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies, and Real Options
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Endogenously Informed Boards and the Optimality of Board Power
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Paying for Staying: Managerial Contracts and the Retention Motive
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Agency, Firm Growth and Managerial Turnover
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Mutual Monitoring and Corporate Governance
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Contracting Timely Delivery with Hard to Verify Quality
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The Role of Executive Stock Options as Insurance for CEOs Against Hold-Up
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Paid to Quit
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Job Protection vs. Contracts At-Will: Trading-Off Entrenchment and Shirking
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Number Two Executives: Bottom-up Monitoring
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Financing Innovation with Unobserved Progress
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Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer
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Why are so Many COOs Promoted to CEO? Relative Firm Performance, Executive Rank, Tenure, and COO Promotion in CEO Selection
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Ex Ante Severance Pay, Managerial Exit Costs, and Timeliness of Bad News Disclosure
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Contract Length and Severance Pay
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Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence
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Dynamic Contracting Under Soft Information
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Information, Incentives and CEO Replacement
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CEO Succession Gap and Firm Performance
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Security Design with Endogenous Implementation Choice
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Executive Mobility in the United States, 1920 to 2011
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Voluntary Disclosures and Managerial Turnover
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To Buy or Not to Buy?: The Effect of Option Granting on Executive Stock Purchases
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To Buy or Not to Buy?: The Effect of Option Granting on Executive Stock Purchases
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Keeping Their Cards Close to Their Chests: How Non‐Delegating CEOs Avoid Forced Career Ends
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Paid to Quit
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Severance payments: main effects and determinants on the labour market
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Firm-supplier relations and managerial compensation
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Does chief executive officer turnover affect green innovation quality and quantity? Evidence from China’s manufacturing enterprises
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Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶We thank Aubrey Clark, Fabrizio Ferri, Carola Frydman, Tom Gosling, Steve Kaplan, Gaizka Ormazabal, Kelly Shue, Alexander Wagner, David Zhang, and especially Pierre Chaigneau for helpful comments and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, Jesus Gorrin,…
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Managerial replacement strategies and severance pay
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Corporate capital budgeting and CEO turnover
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The prevention of excess managerial risk taking
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Nonrecourse Financing and Securitization
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How to Get Banks to Take Less Risk and Disclose Bad News
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CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?
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CEO turnover in a competitive assignment framework
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When are uninformed boards preferable?
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CEO gender and managerial entrenchment
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The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium
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Does Low Price Synchronicity Mean More Informativeness in Stock Prices? Empirical Evidence on Information Integration Speed in the Chinese Stock Market
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Managerial Turnover in a Changing World
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Pay to Quit and Team Incentives
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Corporate Fraud, Governance, and Auditing
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Pay (Be)for(e) Performance: The Signing Bonus as an Incentive Device
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Preventing Zombie Lending
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Managerial Short-Termism, Turnover Policy, and the Dynamics of Incentives
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CEO turnover and the new leader propensity to open innovation
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Shareholders and managers as principal-agent hierarchies and cooperative teams
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Aggressive Boards and CEO Turnover
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Motivating Innovation
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Number Two Executives: Bottom‐Up Monitoring
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Managerial turnover and entrenchment
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Do Firms Gain From Managerial Overconfidence? Managerial Bargaining Power and the Role of Severance Pay
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Agency Contracts, Noncommitment Timing Strategies and Real Options
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Agency, Firm Growth, and Managerial Turnover
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CEO Incentives and Customer‐Supplier Relations
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Job Protection versus Contracts At‐Will: Trading‐Off Entrenchment and Shirking
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Ex Ante Severance Agreements and Timely Disclosures of Bad News
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Does Ex Ante Severance Pay Affect the Timeliness of Bad News Disclosure? The Role of Managerial Exit Costs
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Arranging Golden Goodbyes for Executive Exits: A Review and Agenda for Severance Pay
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Separating Ownership and Information
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Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer
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Severance Pay in an Optimal Contract
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Does Pay Activism Pay Off for Shareholders? Shareholder Democracy and Its Discontents
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Fair and Square: A Retention Model of Managerial Compensation
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O severance pay no Brasil: uma análise do Caso HRT
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Optimal incentive contracts with job destruction risk
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Artificial Intelligence in the Boardroom
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Financing Constraints, Performance Manipulation, and Founder Replacement
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Principal Competence and Organizational Candor: How Moderate Expertise Breeds Cover-Ups
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Board Support, CEO (Mis)Reporting, and Scapegoating
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CEO employment contract heterogeneity and acquirer risk-taking
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Information, Incentives, and CEO Replacement
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Hierarchical Organizational Design: A Contest Design Perspective
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CEO Compensation
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Board Power Hierarchy, Corporate Mission, and Green Performance
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CEO Severance Agreements: A Theoretical Examination and Research Agenda
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5539/ibr.v11n8p97openalex-snapshot
Assisted Christian Schools Governance, Practices, Boards Commitments and Performance Measures in Sri Lanka
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