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Board Support, CEO (Mis)Reporting, and Scapegoating

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6032995
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-023-09769-6openalex-snapshot
To Tell or Not To Tell: The Incentive Effects of Disclosing Employer Assessments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adiac.2012.02.006openalex-snapshot
The Effect of Internal Control Deficiencies on the Usefulness of Earnings in Executive Compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.02.001openalex-snapshot
Outside directors and board advising and monitoring performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.010openalex-snapshot
The costs of intense board monitoring
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.004openalex-snapshot
Are busy boards detrimental?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.10.004openalex-snapshot
Board composition and CEO power
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00065-4openalex-snapshot
Capital budgeting and compensation with asymmetric information and moral hazard
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/ccol0521340446.003openalex-snapshot
The theory of contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdr021openalex-snapshot
Prices, Plant Size, and Product Quality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhg050openalex-snapshot
Capital Budgeting in Multidivision Firms: Information, Agency, and Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhq018openalex-snapshot
CEO Replacement Under Private Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00083openalex-snapshot
Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00084openalex-snapshot
The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679x.12350openalex-snapshot
Aggressive Boards and CEO Turnover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1911-3846.12247openalex-snapshot
Optimal Conservatism with Earnings Manipulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00107.xopenalex-snapshot
The economics of earnings manipulation and managerial compensation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2575.2006.00235.xopenalex-snapshot
Reporting bad news on software projects: the effects of culturally constituted views of face‐saving
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2008.00269.xopenalex-snapshot
Board Independence and CEO Turnover
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2008.00318.xopenalex-snapshot
Do Managers Withhold Bad News?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00852.xopenalex-snapshot
Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00891.xopenalex-snapshot
Information Control, Career Concerns, and Corporate Governance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1911-3846.2011.01109.xopenalex-snapshot
Board Monitoring, Consulting, and Reward Structures*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828054201297openalex-snapshot
The Wrong Kind of Transparency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.31.2.163openalex-snapshot
Capital Rationing and Organizational Slack in Capital Budgeting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2118440openalex-snapshot
Arm's Length Relationships
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2393700openalex-snapshot
Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power, Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-52210openalex-snapshot
Biased Boards
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/accr.2009.84.2.405openalex-snapshot
Hurdle Rates and Project Development Efforts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/tar-2018-0397openalex-snapshot
Blame Attribution and Disclosure Propensity
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