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Cartel Behavior, Private Enforcement, and Overcharge Dynamics
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-019-09738-xopenalex-snapshot
Penalising on the Basis of the Severity of the Offence: A Sophisticated Revenue-Based Cartel Penalty
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90025-6openalex-snapshot
Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.010openalex-snapshot
Penalties and the deterrence of unlawful collusion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.07.007openalex-snapshot
Penalizing cartels: The case for basing penalties on price overcharge
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.04.005openalex-snapshot
Does enforcement deter cartels? A tale of two tails
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2014.12.004openalex-snapshot
Are cartel fines optimal? Theory and evidence from the European Union
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(02)00057-7openalex-snapshot
Leniency programs and cartel prosecution
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/260979openalex-snapshot
The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261519openalex-snapshot
Treble Damage Awards in Private Lawsuits for Price Fixing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/711392openalex-snapshot
Leniency and Damages: Where Is the Conflict?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewab010openalex-snapshot
The Effects of Private Damage Claims on Cartel Activity: Experimental Evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhv033openalex-snapshot
THE EUROPEAN DIRECTIVE ON DAMAGES ACTIONS: A MISSED OPPORTUNITY TO RECONCILE COMPENSATION OF VICTIMS AND LENIENCY INCENTIVES
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12079openalex-snapshot
The Distortive Effects of Antitrust Fines Based on Revenue
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12097openalex-snapshot
COMPETITION POLICY AND CARTEL SIZE
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-6598.2005.00313.xopenalex-snapshot
OPTIMAL CARTEL PRICING IN THE PRESENCE OF AN ANTITRUST AUTHORITY*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00030.xopenalex-snapshot
Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2008.00845.xopenalex-snapshot
Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00170.xopenalex-snapshot
fines , leniency , and rewards in antitrust
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603x1105600203openalex-snapshot
Fines against Hard Core Cartels in Europe: The Myth of Overenforcement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/089533003772034880openalex-snapshot
The Case for Antitrust Enforcement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1593766openalex-snapshot
Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911462openalex-snapshot
Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2296617openalex-snapshot
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4337/9781839102875.00029openalex-snapshot
Cartel activity and recidivism
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