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A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism via endowment-position strategy-proofness
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Strategy-proofness and the strict core in a market with indivisibilities
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An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
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Strategy-proof allocation of indivisible goods
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Incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods
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On cores and indivisibility
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Weak versus strong domination in a market with indivisible goods
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A short proof for the characterization of the core in housing markets
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Alternative characterizations of the top trading cycles rule in housing markets
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Characterizing the TTC rule via pair-efficiency: A short proof
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Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods: A comment
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A characterization of the top-trading-cycles mechanism for housing markets via respecting-improvement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.112159openalex-snapshot
Characterizing TTC via endowments-swapping-proofness and truncation-proofness
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Transplant quality and patientsʼ preferences in paired kidney exchange
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Incentive properties for ordinal mechanisms
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Age-based preferences in paired kidney exchange
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Endowments-Swapping-Proof House Allocation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.05.004openalex-snapshot
Some characterizations of Generalized Top Trading Cycles
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.001openalex-snapshot
A sufficient condition for the equivalence of strategy-proofness and nonmanipulability by preferences adjacent to the sincere one
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2025.103190openalex-snapshot
Some new characterizations of top trading cycles
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.11.010openalex-snapshot
An alternative proof of a characterization of the TTC mechanism
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Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets-in Search of Advice for Participants
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Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
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Motivations and outcomes of compatible living donor–recipient pairs in paired exchange
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School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
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Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets
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The Core of Housing Markets from an Agent’s Perspective: Is It Worth Sprucing up Your Home?
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When Are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient?
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Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
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Local‐global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications
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Pair‐efficient reallocation of indivisible objects
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