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An alternative characterization of top trading cycles

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0713-3
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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem
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An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
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Procedurally fair and stable matching
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The Pareto-dominant strategy-proof and fair rule for problems with indivisible goods
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On two kinds of manipulation for school choice problems
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Two simple variations of top trading cycles
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A simple random assignment problem with a unique solution
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School Choice with Consent *
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Random Serial Dictatorship and the Core from Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems
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Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
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Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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The parameterized complexity of manipulating Top Trading Cycles
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