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Incentives in School Choice with Rank-Dependent Priorities

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7605560
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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2022.11.011openalex-snapshot
School choice with preference rank classes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.008openalex-snapshot
Rankings-dependent preferences: A real goods matching experiment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.11.005openalex-snapshot
Welfare properties of the Taiwan mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.002openalex-snapshot
Constrained school choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.01.004openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof Pareto-improvement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102496openalex-snapshot
School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.02.002openalex-snapshot
Games of school choice under the Boston mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.05.008openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness and stability of the Boston mechanism: An almost impossibility result
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.03.006openalex-snapshot
A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827openalex-snapshot
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/00029890.1981.11995301openalex-snapshot
Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/689773openalex-snapshot
Chinese College Admissions and School Choice Reforms: A Theoretical Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00383openalex-snapshot
Efficient Resource Allocation on the Basis of Priorities
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1112/jlms/s1-10.37.26openalex-snapshot
On Representatives of Subsets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219201openalex-snapshot
First-Choice Maximal and First-Choice Stable School Choice Mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061openalex-snapshot
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282805774669637openalex-snapshot
The Boston Public School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.103.1.80openalex-snapshot
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.669openalex-snapshot
What's the Matter with Tie-Breaking? Improving Efficiency in School Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.4.1636openalex-snapshot
Leveling the Playing Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism
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