On the public citation graph
A Characterization of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for the School Choice Problem
0 signed · 69 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2469openalex-snapshot
A Tale of Two Mechanisms: Student Placement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2553openalex-snapshot
House Allocation with Existing Tenants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01215380openalex-snapshot
Top dominance and the possibility of strategy-proof stable solutions to matching problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-008-0136-3openalex-snapshot
Coalitional strategy-proofness and resource monotonicity for house allocation problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-011-0311-9openalex-snapshot
An alternative characterization of the deferred acceptance algorithm
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400177openalex-snapshot
Resource-monotonicity for house allocation problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0713-3openalex-snapshot
An alternative characterization of top trading cycles
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0769-8openalex-snapshot
The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90026-1openalex-snapshot
Monotonicity properties of bargaining solutions when applied to economics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90033-0openalex-snapshot
On cores and indivisibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-12-370182-4.50015-5openalex-snapshot
The Consistency Principle
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.10.010openalex-snapshot
House allocation with existing tenants: A characterization
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.004openalex-snapshot
Making just school assignments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.010openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof improvements upon deferred acceptance: A maximal domain for possibility
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.11.001openalex-snapshot
On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.04.001openalex-snapshot
Object allocation via immediate-acceptance: Characterizations and an affirmative action application
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.001openalex-snapshot
School choice with neighbors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.04.005openalex-snapshot
Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00038-5openalex-snapshot
Consistency in house allocation problems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0266267112000296openalex-snapshot
ON THE AXIOMATICS OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION: INTERPRETING THE CONSISTENCY PRINCIPLE
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00166openalex-snapshot
Strategyproof Assignment by Hierarchical Exchange
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080213openalex-snapshot
The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.2010.125.3.1297openalex-snapshot
School Choice with Consent *
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282803322157061openalex-snapshot
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.5.1954openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proofness versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20190307openalex-snapshot
Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te2201openalex-snapshot
Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_28openalex-snapshot
The Role of Characterizations in Market Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00667-3openalex-snapshot
Matching with restricted trade
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0769-8openalex-snapshot
The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-014-0820-4openalex-snapshot
Two simple variations of top trading cycles
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01213-8openalex-snapshot
On endowments and indivisibility: partial ownership in the Shapley–Scarf model
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-016-0981-0openalex-snapshot
Characterizations of the Cumulative Offer Process
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-022-09578-2openalex-snapshot
The parameterized complexity of manipulating Top Trading Cycles
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2017.04.006openalex-snapshot
Strategy-proof school choice mechanisms with minimum quotas and initial endowments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2022.103825openalex-snapshot
Strategyproof Allocation Mechanisms with Endowments and M-convex Distributional Constraints
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.11.022openalex-snapshot
Incompatibility between stability and consistency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.05.004openalex-snapshot
Making just school assignments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.003openalex-snapshot
Competitive equilibria in school assignment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.004openalex-snapshot
Endowments-Swapping-Proof House Allocation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.012openalex-snapshot
Respecting priorities versus respecting preferences in school choice: When is there a trade-off?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.003openalex-snapshot
Justified-envy-minimal efficient mechanisms for priority-based matching
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2017.04.005openalex-snapshot
When preference misreporting is Harm[less]ful?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.001openalex-snapshot
School choice with neighbors
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102631openalex-snapshot
Trading probabilities along cycles
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.102967openalex-snapshot
Housing markets since Shapley and Scarf
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.04.005openalex-snapshot
Alternative characterizations of Boston mechanism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2018.08.004openalex-snapshot
The modified Boston mechanism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.001openalex-snapshot
Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdaa071openalex-snapshot
The Cutoff Structure of Top Trading Cycles in School Choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12335openalex-snapshot
THE EQUITABLE TOP TRADING CYCLES MECHANISM FOR SCHOOL CHOICE
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080213openalex-snapshot
The Mechanism Design Approach to Student Assignment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20190307openalex-snapshot
Efficiency, Justified Envy, and Incentives in Priority-Based Matching
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200148openalex-snapshot
Robust Minimal Instability of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20230116openalex-snapshot
Simple Manipulations in School Choice Mechanisms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/mic.6.1.258openalex-snapshot
House Allocation with Overlapping Generations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2180357openalex-snapshot
Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange: Tuition and Worker Exchanges
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2667708openalex-snapshot
When Manipulations Are Harm[less]ful?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2927361openalex-snapshot
Pre-Exchange-Proof House Allocation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5407138openalex-snapshot
Top Trading Cycles with Reserve Systems
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6258609openalex-snapshot
Efficient Mechanism Design with Distributional Objectives and Ties
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7605560openalex-snapshot
Incentives in School Choice with Rank-Dependent Priorities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3386/w23265openalex-snapshot
Minimizing Justified Envy in School Choice: The Design of New Orleans' OneApp
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/te2201openalex-snapshot
Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5555/2936924.2936938openalex-snapshot
Pareto Efficient Strategy-proof School Choice Mechanism with Minimum Quotas and Initial Endowments
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.