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Persuasion Meets Delegation

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-017-0133-4openalex-snapshot
A note on interval delegation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-247x(65)90049-1openalex-snapshot
Integrals of set-valued functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.04.011openalex-snapshot
Continuity in mechanism design without transfers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2015.02.006openalex-snapshot
Experimental design to persuade
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2007.02.004openalex-snapshot
Veto-based delegation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.06.008openalex-snapshot
Stochastic mechanisms in settings without monetary transfers: The regular case
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2008.08.010openalex-snapshot
Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2013.09.014openalex-snapshot
Optimal limited authority for principal
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.013openalex-snapshot
Stress tests and information disclosure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0003055401002192openalex-snapshot
Asymmetric Information and Legislative Rules: Some Amendments
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/657922openalex-snapshot
Optimal Information Disclosure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/701813openalex-snapshot
The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1090/mbk/121/32openalex-snapshot
Theory of games and economic behavior
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00227openalex-snapshot
Authority and Communication in Organizations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00471.xopenalex-snapshot
Optimal Delegation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1198/tech.2003.s176openalex-snapshot
Comparison Methods for Stochastic Models and Risks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177700153openalex-snapshot
The Existence of Probability Measures with Given Marginals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1214/aoms/1177728259openalex-snapshot
The Theory of Decision Procedures for Distributions with Monotone Likelihood Ratio
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1239/jap/1005091031openalex-snapshot
On the optimal stopping values induced by general dependence structures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20201817openalex-snapshot
Delegation in Veto Bargaining
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210890openalex-snapshot
The Comparative Statics of Sorting
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.2.683openalex-snapshot
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.p20161049openalex-snapshot
A Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach to Bayesian Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.20181489openalex-snapshot
Information Design: A Unified Perspective
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.2.2.34openalex-snapshot
Information Disclosure and Unraveling in Matching Markets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/pandp.109.627openalex-snapshot
American Economic Review: Insights
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0003openalex-snapshot
Monopolistic Signal Provision †
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3161811openalex-snapshot
Persuasion Meets Delegation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3474376openalex-snapshot
The Persuasion Duality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551258openalex-snapshot
Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4882142openalex-snapshot
Persuasion Meets Delegation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4912403openalex-snapshot
A Dynamic Optimization Approach to Delegation with an Application to Volunteer Contracts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912769openalex-snapshot
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2233492openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Models in Economic Theory.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2601016openalex-snapshot
Communication in Settings with No Transfers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951479openalex-snapshot
Monotone Comparative Statics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10592openalex-snapshot
On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta13251openalex-snapshot
Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15668openalex-snapshot
The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta16962openalex-snapshot
Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Limited Enforcement
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta8025openalex-snapshot
Bayesian and Dominant-Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private-Values Model
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9288openalex-snapshot
The Theory of Optimal Delegation With an Application to Tariff Caps
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta9869openalex-snapshot
Aggregating the Single Crossing Property
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1805openalex-snapshot
Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te4071openalex-snapshot
Censorship as optimal persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te4663openalex-snapshot
Optimal persuasion via bi‐pooling
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te4691openalex-snapshot
Regulating a monopolist with uncertain costs without transfers
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te5026openalex-snapshot
Conveying value via categories
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te5173openalex-snapshot
Optimal disclosure of information to privately informed agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003549772-26openalex-snapshot
The Journal of Political Economy

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4621318openalex-extracted
Contractibility Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.10.002openalex-snapshot
A dynamic optimization approach to delegation with an application to volunteer contracts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.70028openalex-snapshot
Delegation as a Signal: Implicit Communication With Full Cooperation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467561openalex-snapshot
Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5213652openalex-snapshot
Authority, Communication, and Internal Markets
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6461701openalex-snapshot
Persuasion Under Endogenous Attention: A Theory of Information Design with Rationally Inattentive Receivers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6813359openalex-snapshot
The Geometry of Optimal Delegation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6861744openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Non-Persuasion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.7269135openalex-snapshot
Robust Narrative Persuasion
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