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Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-34675-5openalex-snapshot
Stochastic Orders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01277-xopenalex-snapshot
Optimal monotone signals in Bayesian persuasion mechanisms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6openalex-snapshot
Monopoly and product quality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2010.02.001openalex-snapshot
Grading exams: or ?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.10.009openalex-snapshot
Political disagreement and information in elections
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.09.005openalex-snapshot
Monotone Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.006openalex-snapshot
Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.05.013openalex-snapshot
Stress tests and information disclosure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmoneco.2009.04.006openalex-snapshot
Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/518010openalex-snapshot
Contests for Status
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/648432openalex-snapshot
Opinions as Incentives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/657922openalex-snapshot
Optimal Information Disclosure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/701813openalex-snapshot
The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12166openalex-snapshot
Investment in concealable information by biased experts
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00491.xopenalex-snapshot
UNIVERSITY COMPETITION, GRADING STANDARDS, AND GRADE INFLATION
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2010.00114.xopenalex-snapshot
On the origin of shared beliefs (and corporate culture)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355304772839579openalex-snapshot
Waiting to Persuade
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828042002697openalex-snapshot
Rational Overoptimism (and Other Biases)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.6.2590openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20161441openalex-snapshot
Persuasion: The Art of Changing Worldviews
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.99.2.448openalex-snapshot
Authority versus Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20200284openalex-snapshot
Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20130080openalex-snapshot
Grading Standards and Education Quality
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1323openalex-snapshot
Overconfidence by Bayesian-Rational Agents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2012-0003openalex-snapshot
Monopolistic Signal Provision †
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2913669openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Persuasion and Moral Hazard
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3161811openalex-snapshot
Persuasion Meets Delegation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3501474openalex-snapshot
Censorship as Optimal Persuasion
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3551258openalex-snapshot
Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3616781openalex-snapshot
Assortative Information Disclosure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4204824openalex-snapshot
Persuasion with Non-Linear Preferences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911158openalex-snapshot
The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2556078openalex-snapshot
Information Revelation and Certification Intermediaries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15668openalex-snapshot
The Interval Structure of Optimal Disclosure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta15674openalex-snapshot
Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1805openalex-snapshot
Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te3734openalex-snapshot
Relational communication

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_17openalex-snapshot
Threshold Tests as Quality Signals: Optimal Strategies, Equilibria, and Price of Anarchy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-021-01383-4openalex-snapshot
Bayesian persuasion and information design: perspectives and open issues
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.005openalex-snapshot
Optimal grading contests
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.009openalex-snapshot
Advisors with hidden motives
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/734095openalex-snapshot
Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.70007openalex-snapshot
Purchase History and Product Personalization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.70013openalex-snapshot
On the Optimality of Full Disclosure
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467561openalex-snapshot
Optimal Disclosure of Information to a Privately Informed Receiver
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1257/aeri.20200284openalex-snapshot
Information Validates the Prior: A Theorem on Bayesian Updating and Applications
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3474376openalex-snapshot
The Persuasion Duality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3537289openalex-snapshot
On Information Design with Spillovers
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3919032openalex-snapshot
Troll Farms
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4028840openalex-snapshot
Public Persuasion in Elections: Single-Crossing Property and the Optimality of Interval Revelation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4433764openalex-snapshot
Signaling with Commitment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4882142openalex-snapshot
Persuasion Meets Delegation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5397901openalex-snapshot
Explainable Information Design
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6502883openalex-snapshot
Social Learning with Coarse Communication
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17051openalex-snapshot
Persuasion Meets Delegation
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