On the public citation graph
Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment
0 signed · 121 inferred · view as graph
Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.
Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the
claims that are yours.
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a
known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped
badge you can embed.
What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-50701-9_16openalex-snapshot
General theory of cumulative inference
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00248849openalex-snapshot
Partition and revision: The semantics of counterfactuals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00248850openalex-snapshot
Ordering semantics and premise semantics for counterfactuals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00284973openalex-snapshot
Two methods of constructing contractions and revisions of knowledge systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00370430openalex-snapshot
On the logic of theory change: Safe contraction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00373274openalex-snapshot
Maps between some different kinds of contraction function: The finite case
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0018418openalex-snapshot
Epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilities and relational belief revision
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0018420openalex-snapshot
A nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0018421openalex-snapshot
Relations between the logic of theory change and nonmonotonic logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0023327openalex-snapshot
Is it impossible to keep up to date?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(90)90101-5openalex-snapshot
Nonmonotonic reasoning, preferential models and cumulative logics
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(92)90041-uopenalex-snapshot
What does a conditional knowledge base entail?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511526664.005openalex-snapshot
On the logic of theory change: More maps between different kinds of contraction functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511526664.007openalex-snapshot
On the difference between updating a knowledge base and revising it
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1913486openalex-snapshot
Ordinal Preference and Rational Choice
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2274239openalex-snapshot
On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.25911/5d74e78371a9bopenalex-snapshot
Relevant logics, modal logics and theory change
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/11941439_13openalex-snapshot
Knowledge Compilation for Belief Change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58095-6_1openalex-snapshot
The role of expectations in reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58467-6_25openalex-snapshot
Coherent choice and epistemic entrenchment (preliminary report)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-75775-5_5openalex-snapshot
Trust Is All You Need: From Belief Revision to Information Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-97022-1_3openalex-snapshot
The AGM Model of Theory Change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-97022-1_5openalex-snapshot
Extensions and Alternatives of the AGM Model
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-05134-9_19openalex-snapshot
Gärdenfors’s Supplementary Postulates for Partial Product Contractions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-11558-0_26openalex-snapshot
Four Floors for the Theory of Theory Change: The Case of Imperfect Discrimination
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-20451-2_16openalex-snapshot
Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-76928-6_52openalex-snapshot
Implementing Iterated Belief Change Via Prime Implicates
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04893-7_4openalex-snapshot
A General Family of Preferential Belief Removal Operators
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14159-1openalex-snapshot
Revision, Acceptability and Context : Theoretical and Algorithmic Aspects
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14159-1_2openalex-snapshot
Introducing Revision Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15675-5_29openalex-snapshot
Horn Contraction via Epistemic Entrenchment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7759-0_4openalex-snapshot
Safe Contraction Revisited
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5054-5_2openalex-snapshot
Revision of Belief Sets and Belief Bases
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5524-3_6openalex-snapshot
Closure-Invariant Rationality Postulates
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5524-3_8openalex-snapshot
Drawing Inferences from Conditionals
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8311-4_2openalex-snapshot
Taking Belief Bases Seriously
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9817-0_10openalex-snapshot
Contraction of Epistemic States: A General Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-9817-0_11openalex-snapshot
Two Notions of Epistemic Entrenchment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00248151openalex-snapshot
Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00413766openalex-snapshot
Belief change as change in epistemic entrenchment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf01130759openalex-snapshot
Iterated belief change based on epistemic entrenchment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0023426openalex-snapshot
Modellings for belief change: Base contraction, multiple contraction, and epistemic entrenchment (preliminary report)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0035629openalex-snapshot
Entrenchment relations: A uniform approach to nonmonotonicity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-019-09635-9openalex-snapshot
Impossibility results for belief contraction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10506-010-9097-5openalex-snapshot
Norm-system revision: theory and application
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-013-9548-yopenalex-snapshot
Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default Reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-022-00553-7openalex-snapshot
Paraconsistent Belief Revision: An Algebraic Investigation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-011-9217-zopenalex-snapshot
Stratified Belief Bases Revision with Argumentative Inference
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-012-9235-5openalex-snapshot
A General Family of Preferential Belief Removal Operators
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-020-09587-0openalex-snapshot
On a Logico-Algebraic Approach to AGM Belief Contraction Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-025-09790-xopenalex-snapshot
Between Burgess and Lewis – Part II: Semantics without Rational Monotonicity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-021-09961-2openalex-snapshot
A Characterization of Probability-based Dichotomous Belief Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-026-10264-7openalex-snapshot
Non-prioritized Kernel Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9763-xopenalex-snapshot
Equilibria in social belief removal
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2010.08.001openalex-snapshot
Double preference relations for generalised belief change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2018.03.007openalex-snapshot
Shielded base contraction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2019.05.002openalex-snapshot
Belief base contraction by belief accrual
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2023.103907openalex-snapshot
Levi and Harper identities for non-prioritized belief base change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2023.109007openalex-snapshot
Toward credible belief base revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijar.2023.109108openalex-snapshot
Relevance, recovery and recuperation: A prelude to ring withdrawal
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2006.01.011openalex-snapshot
Revision by comparison as a unifying framework: Severe withdrawal, irrevocable revision and irrefutable revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(97)00066-0openalex-snapshot
A unified model of qualitative belief change: a dynamical systems perspective
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0004-3702(99)00092-2openalex-snapshot
A foundationalist view of the AGM theory of belief change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s0168-0072(98)00036-0openalex-snapshot
To preference via entrenchment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/9781316756140.028openalex-snapshot
“Just Because”: Taking Belief Bases Seriously
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511526664.001openalex-snapshot
Belief revision: An introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511526664.005openalex-snapshot
On the logic of theory change: More maps between different kinds of contraction functions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0269888910000391openalex-snapshot
On the evolving relation between Belief Revision and Argumentation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0269888912000021openalex-snapshot
Modeling knowledge dynamics in multi-agent systems based on informants
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s0269888915000132openalex-snapshot
Resolving conflicts in knowledge for ambient intelligence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020320000283openalex-snapshot
TWO LEVEL CREDIBILITY-LIMITED REVISIONS
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1004344003217openalex-snapshot
Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005290330684openalex-snapshot
Problems With Formal Models Of Epistemic Entrenchment As Applied To Scientific Theories
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005495400861openalex-snapshot
Beyond Recovery? a Reply to Tennant
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005509518324openalex-snapshot
Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1008316802976openalex-snapshot
Refined Epistemic Entrenchment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1013064206171openalex-snapshot
Entrenchment versus Dependence: Coherence and Foundations in Belief Change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1018960323808openalex-snapshot
Relevance sensitive belief structures
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/11663081.2023.2248775openalex-snapshot
Merging operators on stratified belief bases equipped with argumentative inference
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/11663081.2025.2611670openalex-snapshot
Non-prioritised kernel contraction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/46.3.361openalex-snapshot
How Not to Change the Theory of Theory Change: A Reply to Tennant
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/10.4.603openalex-snapshot
Measuring similarity in belief revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1992.tb01154.xopenalex-snapshot
Modellings for belief change: Prioritization and entrenchment*
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1997.tb00740.xopenalex-snapshot
On the logic of small changes in hypertheories
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.11606/t.45.2020.tde-16032020-192134openalex-snapshot
Belief change without compactness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.11606/t.45.2020.tde-19032020-043422openalex-snapshot
Modularity in belief change of description logic bases
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1177/30504554261426170openalex-snapshot
From Doyle to AGM: A Survey and an Implementation Roadmap for Belief Change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1184/r1/6492818openalex-snapshot
The Learning Power of Belief Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1038234607openalex-snapshot
An Information-Based Theory of Conditionals
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1040308829openalex-snapshot
Belief Revision, Conditional Logic and Nonmonotonic Reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1040308833openalex-snapshot
On the Revision of Probabilistic Belief States
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1613/jair.4430openalex-snapshot
Entrenchment-Based Horn Contraction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.19153/cleiej.24.1.4openalex-snapshot
Belief Change without Compactness
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2275152openalex-snapshot
Belief contraction in the context of the general theory of rational choice
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2586557openalex-snapshot
Belief contraction as nonmonotonic inference
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2695064openalex-snapshot
Logics of belief change without linearity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/256openalex-snapshot
Two Sides of the Same Coin: Belief Revision and Enforcing Arguments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/257openalex-snapshot
Belief Update without Compactness in Non-finitary Languages
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/889openalex-snapshot
Shielded Base Contraction (Extended Abstract)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3166/jancl.11.35-58openalex-snapshot
The lexicographic closure as a revision process
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31812/0564/1732openalex-snapshot
Логіка перегляду переконань: пізнавальні дії як модальні оператори
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.cs/0204032openalex-snapshot
Belief Revision and Rational Inference
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity
Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers
publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free
and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.