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Iterated belief change based on epistemic entrenchment

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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Journal of Logic, Language and Information
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Journal of Philosophical Logic
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Ordinal Conditional Functions: A Dynamic Theory of Epistemic States
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A Theory of Conditionals
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Preferential belief change using generalized epistemic entrenchment
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00247909openalex-snapshot
Two modellings for theory change
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Two methods of constructing contractions and revisions of knowledge systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00370430openalex-snapshot
On the logic of theory change: Safe contraction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00373274openalex-snapshot
Maps between some different kinds of contraction function: The finite case
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00869346openalex-snapshot
Conditionals and theory change: Revisions, expansions, and additions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01054039openalex-snapshot
Reversing the Levi identity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01083166openalex-snapshot
Changes in preference
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01181682openalex-snapshot
Changes of disjunctively closed bases
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0018420openalex-snapshot
A nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0018427openalex-snapshot
Multiple contraction a further case against gärdenfors' principle of recovery
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0023426openalex-snapshot
Modellings for belief change: Base contraction, multiple contraction, and epistemic entrenchment (preliminary report)
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-1-4832-1452-8.50152-4openalex-snapshot
Transmutations of Knowledge Systems
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511526664.004openalex-snapshot
A dyadic representation of belief
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511526664.005openalex-snapshot
On the logic of theory change: More maps between different kinds of contraction functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1989.tb00725.xopenalex-snapshot
New operators for theory change
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1992.tb01154.xopenalex-snapshot
Modellings for belief change: Prioritization and entrenchment*
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1093635755openalex-snapshot
Theory revision and probability.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2026706openalex-snapshot
Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2274239openalex-snapshot
On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

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A Method for Reasoning about Other Agents' Beliefs from Observations
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.