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Epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilities and relational belief revision
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00296175openalex-snapshot
On probabilistic representation of non-probabilistic belief revision
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00413567openalex-snapshot
Belief revision, epistemic conditionals and the Ramsey test
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0018427openalex-snapshot
Multiple contraction a further case against gärdenfors' principle of recovery
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1112/jlms/s1-41.1.572openalex-snapshot
THE MATHEMATICS OF METAMATHEMATICS
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2274239openalex-snapshot
On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
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Filtered Belief Revision: Syntax and Semantics
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New Foundations for a Relational Theory of Theory-revision
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21 Modal logic and philosophy
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Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery)
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Ddl Unlimited: Dynamic Doxastic Logic for Introspective Agents
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Recovery and Epistemic Residue
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Entrenchment versus Dependence: Coherence and Foundations in Belief Change
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Epistemic-entrenchment Characterization of Parikh’s Axiom
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Belief Update without Compactness in Non-finitary Languages
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Динамика познавательных действий: AGM и DDL
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Proposal for a Theory of Belief Revision Along the Lines of Lindström and Rabinowicz
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Credibility of Information for Modelling Belief State and Its Change
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Characterization of AGM Belief Contraction in Terms of Conditionals
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