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Conditionals and theory change: Revisions, expansions, and additions
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-9117-0_4openalex-snapshot
A Defense of Conditional Excluded Middle
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00370643openalex-snapshot
Variations on the Ramsey test: More triviality results
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00869347openalex-snapshot
Reflective modalities and theory change
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00869641openalex-snapshot
Iteration of conditionals and the Ramsey test
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(85)90042-6openalex-snapshot
Semantical considerations on nonmonotonic logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(88)90021-5openalex-snapshot
On the relation between default and autoepistemic logic
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/07268608408599325openalex-snapshot
Conditional interpretations ofif‐sentences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1963.tb00807.xopenalex-snapshot
ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0149.1964.tb00868.xopenalex-snapshot
ACTA PHILOSOPHICA FENNICA
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.1986.tb00108.xopenalex-snapshot
Antecedents and consequents
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2026706openalex-snapshot
Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2185133openalex-snapshot
Belief Revisions and the Ramsey Test for Conditionals
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2272204openalex-snapshot
Ernest W. Adams. Subjunctive and indicative conditionals. Foundations of language, vol. 6 (1970), pp. 89–94.
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
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A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-58107-3_5openalex-snapshot
Normative, subjunctive and autoepistemic defaults
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A Qualitative Theory of Dynamic Interactive Belief Revision
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Learning by Questions and Answers: From Belief-Revision Cycles to Doxastic Fixed Points
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62843-0_6openalex-snapshot
Monotonicity in Intuitionistic Minimal Change Semantics Given Gärdenfors’ Triviality Result
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Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-9609-8_1openalex-snapshot
AGM Theory and Artificial Intelligence
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Contraction, Revision, Expansion: Representing Belief Change Operations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-7759-0_6openalex-snapshot
AGM, Ranking Theory, and the Many Ways to Cope with Examples
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5054-5_4openalex-snapshot
Conditionals and the Ramsey Test
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5524-3_8openalex-snapshot
Drawing Inferences from Conditionals
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-8311-4_2openalex-snapshot
Taking Belief Bases Seriously
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00248151openalex-snapshot
Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00370165openalex-snapshot
Conditionals and monotonic belief revisions: the success postulate
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00401549openalex-snapshot
The G�rdenfors impossibility theorem in non-monotonic contexts
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00869347openalex-snapshot
Reflective modalities and theory change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf01130759openalex-snapshot
Iterated belief change based on epistemic entrenchment
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0018419openalex-snapshot
The negative Ramsey test: Another triviality result
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bfb0018420openalex-snapshot
A nonmonotonic conditional logic for belief revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-022-09809-yopenalex-snapshot
Raising awareness without disclosing truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9294-yopenalex-snapshot
Keep Changing Your Beliefs, Aiming for the Truth
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-022-09367-wopenalex-snapshot
The Effort of Reasoning: Modelling the Inference Steps of Boundedly Rational Agents
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-005-9006-7openalex-snapshot
What Might be the Case after a Change in View
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9364-8openalex-snapshot
An Update on Epistemic Modals
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-019-09528-6openalex-snapshot
Indicative Conditionals and Graded Information
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-018-9807-7openalex-snapshot
Back to Basics: Belief Revision Through Direct Selection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-018-9812-xopenalex-snapshot
Truth-Tracking by Belief Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-014-0576-1openalex-snapshot
What difference might and may make
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-008-0026-0openalex-snapshot
Nonbelief and the Desire-As-Belief Thesis
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-88650-7.50017-2openalex-snapshot
A General Non-Probabilistic Theory of Inductive Reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-1-4832-1452-8.50114-7openalex-snapshot
A Knowledge-Based Framework for Belief Change, Part II: Revision and Update
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2005.06.004openalex-snapshot
Weak AGM postulates and strong Ramsey Test: A logical formalization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2019.103171openalex-snapshot
From iterated revision to iterated contraction: Extending the Harper Identity
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Conditional Doxastic Models: A Qualitative Approach to Dynamic Belief Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/s1574-6526(07)03008-8openalex-snapshot
Chapter 8 Belief Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005509518324openalex-snapshot
Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1014650108036openalex-snapshot
The Rôle of Language In Belief Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/b:synt.0000024914.61925.5bopenalex-snapshot
A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/605798openalex-snapshot
The Problem of Noncounterfactual Conditionals
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Dynamic Foundations for Deontic Logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzp036openalex-snapshot
A reason maintenance perspective on relevant Ramsey conditionals
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Protocols for belief merge: Reaching agreement via communication
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/jigpal/jzv049openalex-snapshot
Forgetting complex propositions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/logcom/13.1.15openalex-snapshot
Controlled Revision - An Algorithmic Approach for Belief Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzs028openalex-snapshot
Defending the Ramsey Test: What is Wrong with Preservation?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzs042openalex-snapshot
How Serious Is the Paradox of Serious Possibility?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzv154openalex-snapshot
Preservation, Commutativity and Modus Ponens: Two Recent Triviality Results
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw028openalex-snapshot
Preservation and Postulation: Lessons from the New Debate on the Ramsey Test
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/1562814.1562824openalex-snapshot
Group belief dynamics under iterated revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1728714openalex-snapshot
Dynamics of Epistemic Modality
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Rational Defeasible Belief Change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3166/jancl.11.203-229openalex-snapshot
Hypothetical revision and matter-of-fact supposition
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.31812/0564/1732openalex-snapshot
Логіка перегляду переконань: пізнавальні дії як модальні оператори
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4204/eptcs.379.34openalex-snapshot
Cognitive Bias and Belief Revision
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1304.2375openalex-snapshot
A General Non-Probabilistic Theory of Inductive Reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1604.05419openalex-snapshot
Extending the Harper Identity to Iterated Belief Change
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.cs/0103020openalex-snapshot
Belief Revision: A Critique
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The Logic of Conditional Doxastic Actions
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