On the public citation graph

Conditions for equivalence between sequentiality and subgame perfection

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-007-0256-1

0 signed · 20 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.

Claim with ORCID

Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.

See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1006/redy.1998.0029openalex-snapshot

Sequential Equilibrium and Competition in a Diamond–Dybvig Banking Model

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-58242-4openalex-snapshot

Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01766400openalex-snapshot

Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-0032(60)90366-5openalex-snapshot

Contributions to the theory of games.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(83)90076-5openalex-snapshot

Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(91)90155-wopenalex-snapshot

Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/261155openalex-snapshot

Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1162/003355397555136openalex-snapshot

An Economic Model of Representative Democracy

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-012openalex-snapshot

11. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/135684openalex-snapshot

Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911364openalex-snapshot

Subgame Perfect Implementation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912320openalex-snapshot

On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912767openalex-snapshot

Sequential Equilibria

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2951732openalex-snapshot

The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.29-2753openalex-snapshot

Game theory: analysis of conflict

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1697083openalex-extracted

Estimation of Finite Sequential Games

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1984332openalex-extracted

Weakly-Bayesian and Consistent Assessments

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0760-4openalex-snapshot

Bayesian and consistent assessments

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-020-01259-zopenalex-snapshot

The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconom.2013.10.011openalex-snapshot

Estimation of finite sequential games

Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.