On the public citation graph

Is There a Dutch Book Argument for Probability Kinematics?

0 signed · 97 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00873264openalex-snapshot
Conditionalization and observation

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/9780470665084.biblioopenalex-snapshot
Bibliography
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/9780470756614.ch8openalex-snapshot
Induction and Probability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/9781118445112.stat08118openalex-snapshot
Dutch Book
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/9781405164801.ch16openalex-snapshot
Probability, Logic, and Probability Logic
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1002/9781444315080.part1openalex-snapshot
Part Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/1-4020-4101-2_5openalex-snapshot
Discovering “Weight, or the Value of Knowledge”
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_1openalex-snapshot
Belief and Degrees of Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-9198-8_10openalex-snapshot
Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-77434-3_5openalex-snapshot
Induction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-4788-7_21openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Coherence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5712-4_4openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Rules of Updating
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-5712-4_9openalex-snapshot
The Structure of Radical Probabilism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1735-9_4openalex-snapshot
The Bayesian Approach
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134086openalex-snapshot
Updating, supposing, and maxent
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00276790openalex-snapshot
Bayesian rules of updating
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00276795openalex-snapshot
The structure of Radical Probabilism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00413864openalex-snapshot
On the significance of conditional probabilities
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/bf00485955openalex-snapshot
Maximum entropy inference as a special case of conditionalization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-020-00228-1openalex-snapshot
An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for Conditionalization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9377-3openalex-snapshot
Foundations of Probability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-019-01356-3openalex-snapshot
Jeffrey conditionalization: proceed with caution
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9062-9openalex-snapshot
The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9136-7openalex-snapshot
The kinematics of belief and desire
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04175-6openalex-snapshot
Expert deference and Adams conditionalization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-007-9072-0openalex-snapshot
Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens for Conditional Probabilities, and Updating on Uncertain Evidence
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-021-00398-xopenalex-snapshot
Symmetry and partial belief geometry
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-51862-0.50003-4openalex-snapshot
Conditional Probability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2013.02.005openalex-snapshot
Probability and time
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020315000180openalex-snapshot
MERGING OF OPINIONS AND PROBABILITY KINEMATICS
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1017/s1755020320000295openalex-snapshot
KOLMOGOROV CONDITIONALIZERS CAN BE DUTCH BOOKED (IF AND ONLY IF THEY ARE EVIDENTIALLY UNCERTAIN)
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1023/a:1005082908147openalex-snapshot
The Coherence Argument Against Conditionalization
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/00048408712342771openalex-snapshot
Self-doubts and dutch strategies
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1982.10477893openalex-snapshot
Updating Subjective Probability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2026.2647358openalex-snapshot
Two Conceptions of Testimonial Undervaluation
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2013.808163openalex-snapshot
Dynamic inference and everyday conditional reasoning in the new paradigm
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/289350openalex-snapshot
Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/289657openalex-snapshot
Diachronic Rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/392551openalex-snapshot
A Logic of Induction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/432427openalex-snapshot
Radical Probabilism and Bayesian Conditioning*
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/518815openalex-snapshot
Diachronic Coherence and Radical Probabilism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/671427openalex-snapshot
In Defense of Reflection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.1.192756openalex-snapshot
Dutch Strategies for Diachronic Rules: When Believers See the Sure Loss Coming
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192832openalex-snapshot
Dutch Book Arguments and Consistency
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.001.0001openalex-snapshot
Hume's problem: induction and the justification of belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.001.0001.002.003openalex-snapshot
Copyright Page
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.001.0001.002.004openalex-snapshot
Epigraph
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Hume's Argument
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Reliabilism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Realism and the No‐Miracles Argument
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Probabilism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Deductivism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0007openalex-snapshot
The Naturalistic Fallacy
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0008openalex-snapshot
‘A New Species of Logic’
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0009openalex-snapshot
The Logic of Scientific Discovery
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Chance and Probability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0011openalex-snapshot
Finale
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/0198250371.003.0012openalex-snapshot
Coda: ‘Of Miracles’
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199290420.003.0008openalex-snapshot
CHAPTER 7 Dutch Book Arguments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/45.2.451openalex-snapshot
Bayesian Conditionalization and Probability Kinematics
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/46.1.1openalex-snapshot
Theories of Probability
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axy027openalex-snapshot
Inference to the Best Explanation in Uncertain Evidential Situations
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzab023openalex-snapshot
Why Ideal Epistemology?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780195396577-0393openalex-snapshot
Probabilistic Representations of Belief
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.001.0001openalex-snapshot
The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.001.0001.002.004openalex-snapshot
Copyright Page
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.001.0001.002.007openalex-snapshot
Contributors
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0001openalex-snapshot
Introduction
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0002openalex-snapshot
Theoretical Rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0003openalex-snapshot
Practical Aspects of Theoretical Reasoning
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0004openalex-snapshot
Procedural And Substantive Practical Rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0005openalex-snapshot
Humean Rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0006openalex-snapshot
Kant
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0007openalex-snapshot
Duty, Rationality, and Practical Reasons
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0008openalex-snapshot
Bayesianism
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0009openalex-snapshot
Decision Theory and Morality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0010openalex-snapshot
Rationality and Game Theory
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0011openalex-snapshot
Practical Reasoning and Emotion
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0012openalex-snapshot
The Rationality of Being Guided by Rules
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0013openalex-snapshot
Motivated Irrationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0014openalex-snapshot
Paradoxes of Rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0015openalex-snapshot
Rationality and Psychology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0016openalex-snapshot
Gender and Rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0017openalex-snapshot
Rationality and Persons
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0018openalex-snapshot
Rationality, Language, and the Principle of Charity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0019openalex-snapshot
Rationality and Science
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0020openalex-snapshot
Economic Rationality
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0021openalex-snapshot
Legal Theory and the Rational Actor
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195145397.003.0022openalex-snapshot
Rationality and Evolution
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00399.xopenalex-snapshot
Bayesianism I: Introduction and Arguments in Favor
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12471openalex-snapshot
Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2307/2215920openalex-snapshot
Conservatism in Epistemology
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.33064/uaa/978-607-8972-86-9openalex-snapshot
Epistemología bayesiana
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.35588/cc.v2i1.4903openalex-snapshot
Una revisión de la condicionalización bayesiana
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2101.03593openalex-snapshot
The (Relevant) Logic of Scientific Discovery
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202213430openalex-snapshot
Nonrational Belief Paradoxes as Byzantine Failures
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.