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Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default
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What this work says
Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.
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How specific is the relation between executive function and theory of mind? Contributions of inhibitory control and working memory
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A new paper and pencil task reveals adult false belief reasoning bias
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Don’t Mention the Marble! The Role of Attentional Processes in False-Belief Tasks
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Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception
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Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
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Children's early understanding of false belief
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A theory of the child's theory of mind
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Making explicit 3-year-olds' implicit competence with their own false beliefs
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The cost of thinking about false beliefs: Evidence from adults’ performance on a non-inferential theory of mind task
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When facts go down the rabbit hole: Contrasting features and objecthood as indexes to memory
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Discourse-mediation of the mapping between language and the visual world: Eye movements and mental representation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2009.11.008openalex-snapshot
Two sources of evidence on the non-automaticity of true and false belief ascription
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2011.12.016openalex-snapshot
An association account of false belief understanding
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Perspective tracking in progress: Do not disturb
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogpsych.2004.06.002openalex-snapshot
Belief-desire reasoning as a process of selection
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Attributing false beliefs about non-obvious properties at 18 months
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A developmental shift in processes underlying successful belief-desire reasoning
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Processing negated sentences with contradictory predicates: Is a door that is not open mentally closed?
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Core mechanisms in ‘theory of mind’
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2008.07.007openalex-snapshot
Taking a new look at looking at nothing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2009.12.006openalex-snapshot
False-belief understanding in infants
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Making sense of early false-belief understanding
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Representation, space and Hollywood Squares: looking at things that aren't there anymore
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Selective attention and the suppression of cognitive noise.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037//0278-7393.15.4.633openalex-snapshot
Changes in activation levels with negation.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.40.6.1105openalex-snapshot
Executive Function and Theory of Mind: Stability and Prediction From Ages 2 to 3.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-7393.13.2.327openalex-snapshot
Selective attention and the suppression of cognitive noise.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025458openalex-snapshot
Eye movements reveal sustained implicit processing of others' mental states.
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Expectations in counterfactual and theory of mind reasoning
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The Curse of Knowledge in Economic Settings: An Experimental Analysis
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Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds
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Inhibitory processing in the false belief task: Two conjectures
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Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
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Individual Differences in Inhibitory Control and Children's Theory of Mind
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Theory of Mind and Self-Control: More than a Common Problem of Inhibition
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The Projective Way of Knowing: A Useful Heuristic That Sometimes Misleads
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12110openalex-snapshot
Measuring Beliefs in Centimeters: Private Knowledge Biases Preschoolers' and Adults' Representation of Others' Beliefs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12237openalex-snapshot
Relations Between False Belief Understanding and Executive Function in Early Childhood: A Meta-Analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0956-7976.2004.00717.xopenalex-snapshot
Mechanisms of Belief-Desire Reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2005.00410.xopenalex-snapshot
Processing demands in belief‐desire reasoning: inhibition or general difficulty?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00496.xopenalex-snapshot
Choose and choose again: appearance–reality errors, pragmatics and logical ability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1988.tb03192.xopenalex-snapshot
Children's Understanding of Representational Change and Its Relation to the Understanding of False Belief and the Appearance-Reality Distinction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1989.tb02749.xopenalex-snapshot
Exploration of the Autistic Child's Theory of Mind: Knowledge, Belief, and Communication
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.1996.tb01820.xopenalex-snapshot
Between Desires and Beliefs: Young Children's Action Predictions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00691.xopenalex-snapshot
Scaling of Theory-of-Mind Tasks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2005.00859.xopenalex-snapshot
Steps in Theory-of-Mind Development for Children With Deafness or Autism
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2007.01018.xopenalex-snapshot
Language and Theory of Mind: Meta-Analysis of the Relation Between Language Ability and False-belief Understanding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01324.xopenalex-snapshot
Which Penguin Is This? Attributing False Beliefs About Object Identity at 18 Months
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01418.xopenalex-snapshot
Preschoolers’ Implicit and Explicit False-Belief Understanding: Relations With Complex Syntactical Mastery
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2011.01728.xopenalex-snapshot
The Mind Behind the Message: Advancing Theory-of-Mind Scales for Typically Developing Children, and Those With Deafness, Autism, or Asperger Syndrome
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01791.xopenalex-snapshot
Is Belief Reasoning Automatic?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01909.xopenalex-snapshot
The Curse of Knowledge in Reasoning About False Beliefs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01944.xopenalex-snapshot
Action Anticipation Through Attribution of False Belief by 2-Year-Olds
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1176170openalex-snapshot
Mindblind Eyes: An Absence of Spontaneous Theory of Mind in Asperger Syndrome
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797611411584openalex-snapshot
Do 18-Month-Olds Really Attribute Mental States to Others?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612439070openalex-snapshot
Cognitive Load Disrupts Implicit Theory-of-Mind Processing
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797612447819openalex-snapshot
How to Pass the False-Belief Task Before Your Fourth Birthday
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613498260openalex-snapshot
Look Here, Eye Movements Play a Functional Role in Memory Retrieval
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0092406openalex-snapshot
Do Adults Show a Curse of Knowledge in False-Belief Reasoning? A Robust Estimate of the True Effect Size
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1130386openalex-snapshot
Children's Understanding of Representational Change and Its Relation to the Understanding of False Belief and the Appearance-Reality Distinction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-010-0036-yopenalex-snapshot
The signature of inhibition in theory of mind: children’s predictions of behavior based on avoidance desire
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Simulating minds: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading
What points at this work
Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4835170openalex-extracted
Inhibiting True Belief is Needed in False Belief Task for Adults: Evidence from a Negative Priming Study
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-026-05572-3openalex-snapshot
Attributing beliefs is not harder than attributing knowledge
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0290-zopenalex-snapshot
Don’t Mention the Marble! The Role of Attentional Processes in False-Belief Tasks
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001485openalex-snapshot
Rethinking egocentric bias: A computer mouse-tracking study of adult belief processing.
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1701286114openalex-snapshot
Can processing demands explain toddlers’ performance in false-belief tasks?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00275openalex-snapshot
Five-Year-Olds’ Systematic Errors in Second-Order False Belief Tasks Are Due to First-Order Theory of Mind Strategy Selection: A Computational Modeling Study
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3758/s13423-016-1143-1openalex-snapshot
Why are bilinguals better than monolinguals at false-belief tasks?
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