On the public citation graph

Inhibiting True Belief is Needed in False Belief Task for Adults: Evidence from a Negative Priming Study

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4835170
0 signed · 74 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/hbm.22377openalex-extracted
Functional activity and effective connectivity of the posterior medial prefrontal cortex during processing of incongruent mental states
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/icd.2060openalex-extracted
Association between theory of mind and mental state talk in preschoolers and later social competence and behaviour
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/icd.298openalex-extracted
How specific is the relation between executive function and theory of mind? Contributions of inhibitory control and working memory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00221-013-3661-7openalex-extracted
Belief and sign, true and false: the unique of false belief reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00426-008-0150-xopenalex-extracted
Mixing costs and switch costs when switching stimulus dimensions in serial predictions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s10578-008-0119-4openalex-extracted
The Relationship Between Theory of Mind and Executive Function in a Sample of Children from Mainland China
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-020-01209-xopenalex-extracted
Do teachers need to inhibit heuristic Bias in mathematics problem-solving? Evidence from a negative-priming study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-022-03519-8openalex-extracted
Seeing it both ways: examining the role of inhibitory control in level-2 visual perspective-taking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5openalex-extracted
Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8openalex-extracted
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.acdb.2023.05.008openalex-extracted
Development of representational theory of mind: Concepts of mental states, awareness of thinking, and self-permanence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appdev.2008.12.020openalex-extracted
Associations among false-belief understanding, executive function, and social competence: A longitudinal analysis
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2005.05.007openalex-extracted
Representational and executive selection resources in ‘theory of mind’: Evidence from compromised belief-desire reasoning in old age
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2017.06.012openalex-extracted
Efficient belief tracking in adults: The role of task instruction, low-level associative processes and dispositional social functioning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2020.01.016openalex-extracted
The neural basis of belief-attribution across the lifespan: False-belief reasoning and the N400 effect
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dcn.2010.08.001openalex-extracted
True- and false-belief reasoning in children and adults: An event-related potential study of theory of mind
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jecp.2004.01.002openalex-extracted
Individual differences in executive functioning and theory of mind: An investigation of inhibitory control and planning ability
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neulet.2023.137267openalex-extracted
Heterogeneity of social cognition between visual perspective-taking and theory of mind in the temporo-parietal junction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.12.052openalex-extracted
Common and distinct neural networks for false-belief reasoning and inhibitory control
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.03.053openalex-extracted
Inhibit yourself and understand the other: Neural basis of distinct processes underlying Theory of Mind
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.04.011openalex-extracted
Understanding children's and adults' limitations in mental state reasoning
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2004.10.001openalex-extracted
Core mechanisms in ‘theory of mind’
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.10.004openalex-extracted
Domain-specificity and theory of mind: evaluating neuropsychological evidence
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1017/s0140525x00076512openalex-extracted
Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.42.2.207openalex-extracted
Social perspective-taking skills in maltreated children and adolescents.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.43.6.1447openalex-extracted
Executive function and theory of mind: Predictive relations from ages 2 to 4.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.87.3.327openalex-extracted
Perspective Taking as Egocentric Anchoring and Adjustment.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0017648openalex-extracted
True or false: Do 5-year-olds understand belief?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030825openalex-extracted
Hysteresis affects approximate number discrimination in young children.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0032625openalex-extracted
Inhibitory control is needed for the resolution of arithmetic word problems: A developmental negative priming study.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/a0039833openalex-extracted
Peer social skills and theory of mind in children with autism, deafness, or typical development.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0000439openalex-extracted
Theory of mind is related to children’s resource allocations in gender stereotypic contexts.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0001226openalex-extracted
Hindsight bias and false-belief reasoning from preschool to old age.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1037/xge0001485openalex-extracted
Rethinking egocentric bias: A computer mouse-tracking study of adult belief processing.
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/0361073x.2011.619466openalex-extracted
Theory of Mind Through the Ages: Older and Middle-Aged Adults Exhibit More Errors Than Do Younger Adults on a Continuous False Belief Task
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/13607863.2019.1686459openalex-extracted
The mechanism of inhibitory control on the development of theory of mind in old age—based on the two-component model of psychological theory
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/14640748508400920openalex-extracted
The Negative Priming Effect: Inhibitory Priming by Ignored Objects
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/14992027.2018.1498982openalex-extracted
The relationships among verbal ability, executive function, and theory of mind in young children with cochlear implants
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/15248372.2020.1828425openalex-extracted
Prosocial Behavior: The Role of Theory of Mind and Executive Functions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2018.1514324openalex-extracted
Exploring the role of self/other perspective-shifting in theory of mind with behavioural and EEG measures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1098/rsos.181355openalex-extracted
The unreliability of egocentric bias across self–other and memory–belief distinctions in the Sandbox Task
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7687.00038openalex-extracted
Inhibitory processing in the false belief task: Two conjectures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00304openalex-extracted
Meta-Analysis of Theory-of-Mind Development: The Truth about False Belief
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00333openalex-extracted
Individual Differences in Inhibitory Control and Children's Theory of Mind
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12558openalex-extracted
Taking a Third-Person Perspective Requires Inhibitory Control: Evidence From a Developmental Negative Priming Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.13223openalex-extracted
The Capricious Nature of Theory of Mind: Does Mental State Understanding Depend on the Characteristics of the Target?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/cogs.12331openalex-extracted
Can We Forget What We Know in a False‐Belief Task? An Investigation of the True‐Belief Default
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2009.01262.xopenalex-extracted
Neural Correlates of Children’s Theory of Mind Development
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01909.xopenalex-extracted
The Curse of Knowledge in Reasoning About False Beliefs
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00310.xopenalex-extracted
How Do Young Children Process Beliefs About Beliefs?: Evidence from Response Latency
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/sode.12231openalex-extracted
Executive function and theory of mind as predictors of aggressive and prosocial behavior and peer acceptance in early childhood
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1155/2019/5480913openalex-extracted
Impairment in Theory of Mind in Parkinson’s Disease Is Explained by Deficits in Inhibition
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0165025419850901openalex-extracted
Progressing from an implicit to an explicit false belief understanding: A matter of executive control?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0165025420988594openalex-extracted
Little pranksters: Inhibitory control mediates the association between false belief understanding and practical joking in young children
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/1362361311434545openalex-extracted
A continuous false belief task reveals egocentric biases in children and adolescents with Autism Spectrum Disorders
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/1747021817742367openalex-extracted
Egocentric bias across mental and non-mental representations in the Sandbox Task
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/1747021820987080openalex-extracted
Lifting the curse of knowing: How feedback improves perspective-taking
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/17470218221132539openalex-extracted
A curse of knowledge or a curse of uncertainty? Bilingualism, embodiment, and egocentric bias
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327647jcd0403_01openalex-extracted
False Beliefs or False Positives? Limits on Children's Understanding of Mental Representation
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327647jcd0403_02openalex-extracted
Ignorance or False Negatives: Do Children of 4 to 5 Years Simulate Belief With "Not Knowing = Getting it Wrong?"
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.12681/psy_hps.33349openalex-extracted
The relationship between Theory of Mind and Executive Functioning in typically developing children: A systematic review
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1348/026151005x26877openalex-extracted
Guessing versus choosing – and seeing versus believing – in false belief tasks
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0092406openalex-extracted
Do Adults Show a Curse of Knowledge in False-Belief Reasoning? A Robust Estimate of the True Effect Size
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0185345openalex-extracted
False-belief reasoning from 3 to 92 years of age
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0198616openalex-extracted
Does social distance modulate adults’ egocentric biases when reasoning about false beliefs?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0244141openalex-extracted
Are the classic false belief tasks cursed? Young children are just as likely as older children to pass a false belief task when they are not required to overcome the curse of knowledge
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0262251openalex-extracted
Development of cool and hot theory of mind and cool and hot inhibitory control abilities from 3.5 to 6.5 years of age
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2147/prbm.s333824openalex-extracted
Inhibitory Control was needed in Level-1 Visual Perspective Taking: A Developing Negative Priming Study
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.24425/ppb.2019.129451openalex-extracted
Visual Perspective -Taking: Are Theory of Mind and Executive Function Involved?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2466/pms.102.3.819-835openalex-extracted
Theory of Mind and Executive Function: Working-Memory Capacity and Inhibitory Control as Predictors of False-Belief Task Performance
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00616openalex-extracted
Measuring inhibitory control in children and adults: brain imaging and mental chronometry
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1142302openalex-extracted
How robust are egocentric and altercentric interference effects in social cognition? a test with explicit and implicit versions of a continuous false belief task
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3758/brm.41.4.1149openalex-extracted
Statistical power analyses using G*Power 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analyses
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-021-00899-5openalex-extracted
The Dynamic Differences between Self- and Other-Oriented Mental Inferences: An ERP Study on a False-Belief Task
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.