On the public citation graph

The Better Half of Selling Separately

0 signed · 19 inferred · view as graph

Inferred edges come from two machine sources: sweeps of open repository metadata (mostly SSRN and Zenodo), and a bulk OpenAlex citation snapshot. Every row below is labelled with the one it came from. Neither is a complete citation index — absence here is not evidence of absence.

Is this your work? Sign in with ORCID and put your name on the claims that are yours.
Claim with ORCID
Reference health. See whether every reference in this work resolves to a known work and none has been retracted — and get a dated CiteStamped badge you can embed.
See reference health

What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470316962openalex-snapshot
Convergence of Probability Measures
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.10.030openalex-snapshot
A note on the continuity of the optimal auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.09.002openalex-snapshot
Haggling over substitutes
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.011openalex-snapshot
Pricing lotteries
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.09.001openalex-snapshot
Approximate revenue maximization with multiple items
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.006openalex-snapshot
Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.6.1.58openalex-snapshot
Optimal Auction Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta12618openalex-snapshot
Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te1517openalex-snapshot
Maximal revenue with multiple goods: Nonmonotonicity and other observations

What points at this work

Incoming claims: where this work appears in other papers’ reference lists and arguments.

inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5047501openalex-extracted
Design and Sale of Market Segments
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-71033-9_16openalex-snapshot
Mind the Revenue Gap: On the Performance of Approximation Mechanisms Under Budget Constraints
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2019.07.006openalex-snapshot
Selling multiple correlated goods: Revenue maximization and menu-size complexity
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105330openalex-snapshot
Efficient demands in a multi-product monopoly
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105397openalex-snapshot
Selling two identical objects
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae107openalex-snapshot
Robustly Optimal Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.1145/3465456.3467570openalex-snapshot
Robustly-Optimal Mechanism for Selling Multiple Goods
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.3982/te6451openalex-snapshot
Lemonade from lemons: Information design and adverse selection
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4135/9781071802601.n32openalex-snapshot
Why Didn’t I See It Earlier?
inferred← citeshttps://doi.org/10.4213/im9648openalex-snapshot
Транспортировка мер и аукционы
Editorial review for independent work. ICSAC — the Institute for Complexity Science and Advanced Computing — runs a structured editorial panel for researchers publishing outside journals, and publishes on CiteStamp rails. Submission is free and goes through ORCID: icsacinstitute.org/submit.