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Design and Sale of Market Segments

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Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-77105-0_63openalex-extracted
Computing Optimal Bundles for Sponsored Search
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/b76887openalex-extracted
Lectures on Choquet’s Theorem
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0177-4openalex-extracted
Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050278openalex-extracted
Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.10.002openalex-extracted
Position auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2007.11.002openalex-extracted
Segmentation, advertising and prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.02.001openalex-extracted
Mixed bundling auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s0167-7187(98)00052-6openalex-extracted
Strategic segmentation of a market
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/714443openalex-extracted
Search, Information, and Prices
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1086/734095openalex-extracted
Persuasion and Matching: Optimal Productive Transport
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdae087openalex-extracted
How Do Digital Advertising Auctions Impact Product Prices?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12118openalex-extracted
Online advertising and privacy
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00442.xopenalex-extracted
Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2011.00143.xopenalex-extracted
Targeting in advertising markets: implications for offline versus online media
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/2956586openalex-extracted
When Does Improved Targeting Increase Revenue?
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1145/3369927openalex-extracted
The Better Half of Selling Separately
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/000282807780323523openalex-extracted
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.2.603openalex-extracted
Online Advertising: Heterogeneity and Conflation in Market Design
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20130848openalex-extracted
The Limits of Price Discrimination
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20151743openalex-extracted
Discriminatory Information Disclosure
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20210616openalex-extracted
Selling Consumer Data for Profit: Optimal Market-Segmentation Design and Its Consequences
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20230478openalex-extracted
Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.1050.0117openalex-extracted
The Targeting of Advertising
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.13.4.581openalex-extracted
Extreme Points of Moment Sets
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1593709openalex-extracted
Ignorance Promotes Competition: An Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911865openalex-extracted
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912001openalex-extracted
Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2527055openalex-extracted
Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta6640openalex-extracted
Signal Orderings Based on Dispersion and the Supply of Private Information in Auctions
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3982/te5900openalex-extracted
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.97.1.242openalex-snapshot
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3474376openalex-snapshot
The Persuasion Duality
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