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Vergütungssysteme für Vorstände – Eine Analyse mehrjähriger Bemessungsgrundlagen und Caps (The Design of Executive Compensation – An Analysis of Long-Term Compensation Components and Caps)

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3220945

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What this work says

Outgoing claims: the papers this work cites, builds on, or argues with.

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Chief executive compensation: A synthesis and reconciliation

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The Costs and Benefits of Managerial Incentives and Monitoring in Large U.S. Corporations: When is More not Better?

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Constraints and incentives for making long horizon corporate investments

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Bonus versus Penalty: Does Contract Frame Affect Employee Effort?

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Unternehmungsplanung und Führungskräftevergütung

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Wertorientierte Management-Incentivesysteme auf Basis interner Wertkennzahlen und Bonusbanken

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Innovation und Risiko — zwei Seiten einer Medaille

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Dividendenpolitik

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Prinzipien der Gestaltung von Managementanreizsystemen

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Wertorientierte Management-Incentivesysteme auf Basis interner Wertkennzahlen

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Strategische Anreizsysteme

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Interne Unternehmensrechnung

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Grundlagen des Operations Research

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Führungskräftevergütung

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Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty

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Struktur und Höhe der Vorstandsvergütung: Fakten und Mythen

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Corporate performance and managerial remuneration

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Bonus and penalty incentives contract choice by employees

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Toward a positive theory of consumer choice

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Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure

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Public Sector Economics

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Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: A laboratory experiment

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Executive compensation: evidence from the UK and Germany

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Determinants of management compensation with risk-averse agents and dispersed ownership of the firm

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Executive compensation and agency costs in Germany

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1016/s1052-0457(02)16021-8openalex-extracted

CREATING SHAREHOLDER VALUE

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Chapter 38 Executive compensation

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Choices, values, and frames.

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The Other Side of the Trade‐Off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation

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Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm

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Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory

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Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions

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The Taxation of Executive Compensation

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Relative performance evaluation in CEO pay contracts: evidence from the commercial banking industry

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Towards multi‐factor models of decision making and risk

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1108/eb028832openalex-extracted

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CEO COMPENSATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF LABOR MARKET NORMS

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7455683openalex-extracted

The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice

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Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/001979399004300303openalex-extracted

Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206307308588openalex-extracted

Executive Compensation: A Multidisciplinary Review of Recent Developments

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Management Theory Applications of Prospect Theory: Accomplishments, Challenges, and Opportunities

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Behavioral agency theory: new foundations for theorizing about executive compensation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206316671583openalex-extracted

Managerial Risk Taking

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828041302262openalex-extracted

CEO Pay and Appointments: A Market-Based Explanation for Recent Trends

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.90.2.197openalex-extracted

Has the “Million-Dollar Cap” Affected CEO Pay?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.1.193openalex-extracted

Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.13.4.327openalex-extracted

Customer Satisfaction Incentives

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.30.11.1350openalex-extracted

Multiattribute Risky Choice Behavior: The Editing of Complex Prospects

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.33.11.1404openalex-extracted

Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.1.63.15130openalex-extracted

Shifts of Reference Points for Framing of Strategic Decisions and Changing Risk-Return Associations

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.46.4.530.12055openalex-extracted

Executive Compensation in the Information Technology Industry

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1070.0317openalex-extracted

Moving Closer to the Action: Examining Compensation Design Effects on Firm Risk

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110504743-026openalex-extracted

Neue Institutionenökonomik

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Wachstum und Höhe von Managementvergütungen

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.1515/zinso-2017-201913openalex-extracted

Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Finanzausschusses (7. Ausschuss) zu dem Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung – Drucksachen 18/11233, 18/11531, 18/11683 Nr. 8 (BT-Drucks. 18/12128)

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.15358/0340-1650-2004-8-470openalex-extracted

Grundlagen der Principal-Agent-Theorie

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.15358/0340-1650-2008-6-290openalex-extracted

Wertorientierte Anreizsysteme

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.648648openalex-extracted

Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1911724openalex-extracted

Repeated Moral Hazard

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1912747openalex-extracted

Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185openalex-extracted

Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2393238openalex-extracted

Managerial Incentives, Monitoring, and Risk Bearing: A Study of Executive Compensation, Ownership, and Board Structure in Initial Public Offerings

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/2490802openalex-extracted

An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/256499openalex-extracted

ATTITUDES TOWARD RISK AND THE RISK-RETURN PARADOX: PROSPECT THEORY EXPLANATIONS.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/256908openalex-extracted

RELATIONSHIPS AMONG RISK, INCENTIVE PAY, AND ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE.

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003320openalex-extracted

Moral Hazard and Observability

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3003645openalex-extracted

Long-Term Contracts and Moral Hazard

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2307/3308267openalex-extracted

The Modern Corporation and Private Property

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50219openalex-extracted

Sticks and Carrots: The Effect of Contract Frame on Effort in Incomplete Contracts

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/bria-50408openalex-extracted

The Effects of Risk Preference and Loss Aversion on Individual Behavior Under Bonus, Penalty, and Combined Contract Frames

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2008.20.1.153openalex-extracted

Contracting Frame and Individual Behavior: Experimental Evidence

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3386/w6634openalex-extracted

The Other Side of the Tradeoff: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation

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Variable Managementvergütung mit Bonusbanken und Obergrenzen

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.3790/978-3-428-43292-9openalex-extracted

Die motivationalen Grundlagen des Verhaltens in Organisationen

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Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5465/256908openalex-extracted

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A Behavioral Agency Model of Managerial Risk Taking

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.42-4735openalex-extracted

Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation

inferredcites →https://doi.org/10.9785/9783504384142openalex-extracted

Aktiengesetz

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Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives

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CEO compensation and subsequent firm performance: An empirical investigation

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Moral Hazard in Teams

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